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Humans are getting more dependent on marine and coastal resources. This has led to increased 
fishery exploitation and in many cases overexploitation with habitat degradation. This threatens 
coastal and marine resources all over the world. The current management approaches have failed 
to control fishing capacity and conflict in sharing fisheries resources due to population growth, 
poverty and a lack of awareness raising. The management and governance of small-scale 
fisheries is ready for worldwide reform.  
In recent years, Marine protected areas (MPAs) are becoming a popular tool for management and 
conservation of marine resources. Co-management is a recommendation as a solution of 
governance for marine protected areas. Co-management is a process that involves 
democratization and decentralization mechanisms through collaboration and power-sharing 
between resource users and government officials (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006) 
This paper highlights the co-management of an MPA in Trao Reef locally managed marine 
reserve, which was established in 2001 to protect and rehabilitate fisheries resources in general 
and the coral reef in particular. In addition, this paper demonstrates one way to approach co-
management which include the transaction-costs, the method for measuring the transaction costs 
in fisheries co-management system. Transaction costs are defined as “the cost of transacting, 
which consists of the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and 
the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements” (North 1990). 
The study is based on fisheries management, co-management, transaction-cost literature and 
secondary and primary data. The reduction of transaction-costs in the last stage of co-
management regime is used to choose alternative institutional arrangements for managing a 
fishery for public policy decisions. This study is also the first paper to mention transaction-costs 










Today, the fisheries are becoming more important. According to the state of world fisheries in 
2008, fishers, aqua-culturists and those supplying services and goods to them assure the 
livelihoods for about 520 million people worldwide, which constitutes 7.9 percent of the world 
population (FAO,2008). In addition, the changing in the supply, demand, value, management and 
uses of fisheries resources in the global-scale could threaten progress towards sustainable food 
security and resource development in many parts of Southeast Asia (Pomeroy, 1995). In order to 
decrease the continuous depletion fisheries resources, it is required that the decision-makers have 
to find better ways to manage fisheries resources. Establishment of marine protected areas 
(MPAs) is as an effective management tool for natural resource in general and fisheries in 
particular throughout the world. According to the Professor Claire W Amstrong in the an MPA 
workshop for the officer of fisheries sector in Ha Noi, Viet Nam (February, 2010), MPAs have 3 
main goals: conservation, fisheries benefits, and benefits for other sectors (tourism, recreation, 
etc.) and she also represented that the general economist stance on marine reserves that marine 
reserves have to be incorporated with other management tools.  
In Vietnam, a country with a coastline of 3,260 km long and thousands of small and big islands 
scattered along the coast and has the potential for developing aquaculture (Heen K., L.T. Tuan, 
2007). The East Sea and it’s coastline have abundant and diversified natural resources like coral 
reefs and mangrove forests, and it also has potential for developing an economy with the multi-
industries and multi-targets. According to the Vietnam Association for Conservation of Nature 
and Environment-VACNE, this therefore is an exciting place to focus on the  human’s 
development activities included over 50% of big cities, 60% of the population which is 
calculated based on the provincial units, most of the big industrial parks and export processing 
zones, most of aquaculture areas, seaport – shipping activities and tourism will be built here in 
2010 (VACNE). These activities lead to increased the migration and demand for using natural 
resources. In consequences it is creating huge pressure on the urban environment, coastal 
communities, and over the capacity of urban planning, leading to depletion and degradation on 
marine resources. There are very little of fisheries in the near-shore waters in which to catch fish 
however the lives of about 600,000 fishermen and their families still need fish for everyday and 
the instinct to survive has forced them to exploit much more fishes (VACNE). Poor fishermen, 
who gave up fishing on the coastline and changed to aquaculture, but they are lack the capital and 
cultivation techniques necessary for aquaculture. Therefore most of them remain poor, and 
eventually have to go back to the sea as before and only to resort to much more intensified 
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exploitation of natural resources with hopefulness of higher income for their family. Finally, they 
fall into a vicious cycle: livelihood requirements - excessive exploitation - depleted resources - 
poverty - livelihood requirements. High poverty rates make difficult for investment and 
development towards industrialization and modernization. Because of instinctive existence, the 
poor and disadvantage people often find themselves willing to "mortgage the future". And 
because of the vicious circle, the fishermen seem to do not care about natural resources and 
environmental protection. In addition, the living habitats and customs of coastal residents in 
general and fishermen in particular, until now, is characterized by low education because lack of 
conditions for learning (Most fishermen’s children only finish the primary school). Their 
awareness about environmental and natural resource protection is therefore still poor. 
Additionally, the infrastructure development of culture and society (electricity, roads, schools, 
stations ,...) in coastal areas is low. The first reason for this is that investment in the past mainly 
focused on big cities, industrial parks, so that the investment rate for this is not adequate. 
Furthermore, the coastline areas have high risks of natural disasters so that the construction here 
has often degraded rapidly. With this current status of the fisheries, it is getting more established 
or proposed MPAs are being established and proposed in Viet Nam, with up to15 MPAs 
proposed to exist by 2015, most of them were managed by local government (Hon Mun MPAs) 
or government officials (Nui chua Park). 
However, the fisheries management realities in Viet Nam have shown that if the fishermen do not 
increase their awareness, have chance to improves their living standards, or are not attracted in 
participating in the management process, then the natural resources and environment will 
continue to be destructed by exploitation. There are a lot of different economic activities in the 
marine and coastal areas in Viet Nam and they are managed by industry. According to this way 
of management, the industry often focuses more on the goals of economic development, and the 
social and environment objectives suffer from lack of attention while each industry only 
considers own their benefits. This system It is leading to increased the conflicts of interests in 
using natural resources in this areas and is negatively affecting sustainability. In the fact, the 
sectors like fisheries, maritime, oil and gas, tourism and the coastal provinces - 28 provinces in 
Viet Nam, Mofi (Ministry of Fisheries, now is  into MARD – Ministry Agriculture and Rural 
Development) have the duties to manage and protect marine resources. The Government has also 
established some consultancy organization or manage the fisheries resource like Frontier 
Committee (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Coast Guard (Ministry of Defense), Island and 
marine committees at the central and local levels. However, it is still a lack of unifying 
regulations about concrete tasks and functions of the each organization and the lack of a 
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consistent decision-making processes that results in effective coordination among involved 
agencies, still under way “who are stronger, who made”. There is a lack of coordination among 
management agencies, scientific institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
using and managing the marine resources, especially in coastal areas. Participation of local 
communities in managed processing is not frequent and when it exist, it is completely passive, 
including lack of detail regulations on rights and responsibilities of participants. The local 
communities are not only using the resources but also subject to management of the natural 
resources. They have indigenous knowledge, and can understand exactly their own works and 
aspirations. Appeals to local communities into managing marine resources is contributing to 
successful implementation of the policy of the Government in order to strengthen democracy at 
the locals level and the principle of "people know, people discuss, people do, people check” in 
the Viet Nam government.  
Understanding this common practice, members of the Van Hung community established Trao 
Reef Marine Reserve in 2001 in co-management system, with the support of the Centre for 
Marine life Conservation and Community Development (MCD), to protect the reef from over-
fishing and destructive fishing practices, and allow the reef to rehabilitate. It is one of the first 
examples of a locally-managed Marine Reserve in Vietnam. Kuperan, et al (1999) said that one 
of the purported advantages of co-management compared to centralized management is that it 
will reduce transaction costs - the cost of gaining information about the resources and what users 
are doing with it, reaching agreements and coordinating with others in the group with respect to 
use of the resource, and enforcing agreements that have been reached (Abdullah et al. 1998b). He 
also points out that a centralized approach is often associated with low program design costs but 
high implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs as the management regime may have 
little legitimacy with user groups. A co-management approach, on the other hand, is associated 
with high program design costs as effective participation is time-consuming and therefore costly. 
However, co-management is likely to lead to lower implementation, monitoring and enforcement 
costs as legitimacy of the regime is greater (Hanna, 1995).  
There are many researchers (The Nha Trang Institute of Oceanography officers) and students 
(Lam Anh, 2003; N.T.Thao, 2009 and Nguyen, 2009, etc) that have investigated about this co-
management model. Most of studies only have evaluated the technical aspects and only one 
researcher have done about economical evaluation (N.T.Thao, 2009) using the Cost Benefit 
analysis (CBA) method. However, Thao’ research also said in her paper that the research can not 
calculate all of the benefit from Trao Reef through the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) method. This 
conclusion encouraged this author to research and find out another way to evaluate economic 
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efficiency when applied the co-management in Trao Reef, that is transaction cost. The 
transaction costs that may either increase or decrease in total costs of fisheries management in a 
co-management system. But, co-management is expected to lead to improved natural resources 
using outcomes as measured by economic efficiency, equity and biological sustainability. Co-
management is believed to be an institutional arrangement for managing fisheries resources, will 
effectively address some of the problems of fishery overexploitation; dissipation and 
redistribution of resource rents; limited fisher participation and conflicts among the different 
groups of resource users (Abdullah al et, 1998). However, the application co-management is 
different in deferent areas, politics etc and this is the first paper mentioned about transaction costs 
in Viet Nam. Therefore, it will only explore some issues related co-management and transaction 
costs based on a case study of Trao Reef, Khanh Hoa province, Viet Nam. The data for this study 
is primary data collected from interviewing the people living in Xuan Tu 1 and Xuan Tu 2 
commune, and Secondary data were collected from archives, MCD, People’s Van Ninh district 
committee, People’s Van Hung commune, Dicafirep.  
There are three (3) main objectives in this paper: 
- Review the literature of fisheries co-management of relevance to the Trao Reef situation, show 
achievements in new management institution (co-management); 
- Explore measurement transaction costs in Trao Reef in co-management system; 
- Identify opportunities and obstacles for applying transaction costs in Trao Reef ‘s fisheries co-
management model.  
To achieve these 3 above objectives, the paper is comprised of 5 main chapters with the 
exclusion of introduction and conclusion. In chapter I background about world fisheries 
management is presented. The literature framework (of fishery co-management and transaction 
costs) are presented chapter II. Chapter III of the paper provides information on the case study in 
Trao Reef, Van Ninh district, Khanh Hoa province, Viet Nam, the research site for the 
transaction cost analysis, the data collection and measurable methodology of transaction costs. 
This is followed by the chapter IV, which explains the results of the research. Discussion from 
results and recommendations after researching is final chapter of the article. 
Co-management in Trao reef Marine Reserve, Vietnam – A transaction costs approach 
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Chapter I  
BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
1.1. Global fisheries management and mismanagement 
1.1.1. Global fisheries management and mismanagement status 
According to the data collected by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the food fish 
worldwide supply in 2006 was about 110 million tones, including 47 percents from aquaculture. 
Fish provides animal proteins for more than 2.9 billion people. Fish protein’s contribution  in 
total world animal protein supplies increased from 14.9 percent in 1992 to 15.3 percent in 2005. 
The worldwide capture fisheries production was about 92 million tones in 2006, including about 
10 million tones from inland waters and 82 million tones from marine waters. Capture fisheries 
and aquaculture play an important role in the livelihoods of millions of people around the world. 
In 2006 it was estimated that there were 43.5 million people who were directly involved with the 
production of fish either capture from the wild or in aquaculture. Eighty six percent of fishers and 
fish farmers world-wide live in Asia  (FAO, 2008). All of 50 of the world’s 51 million fishers 
come from developing countries and are employed in small-scale fisheries. In addition, more 
than half of the world’s annual marine fish catch of 98 million tones are consumed in the 
developing world is supplied by them (Berkes, et al, 2001). Before the turn of the 20th century, it 
is believed that fishery resources were inexhaustible by the industrialized countries of Europe 
(Berkes, et al, 2001). However, today, together with the development of fishing technology 
(fishing lines, fishing vessels …), population growth, … leading to overexploit. The state of 
world fisheries and aquaculture in 2008 showed that “in 2007, about 28 percent of stocks were 
either overexploited (19 percent), depleted (8 percent) or recovering from depletion (1 percent) 
and thus yielding less than their maximum potential owing to excess fishing pressure. A further 
52 percent of stocks were fully exploited and, therefore, producing catches that were at or close 
to their maximum sustainable limits with no room for further expansion. Only about 20 percent 
of stocks were moderately exploited or underexploited with perhaps a possibility of producing 
more” (FAO, 2008). If fishing continues at the current rate, fish could disappear from our oceans 
within half a century. The literature is full of examples citing that unmanaged fisheries will lose 
their economical viability or even collapse in the current literature (Berkes, et al, 2001). Berkes 
affirmed some fish stock  decline examples related in large fish stocks like the Peruvian 
anchoveta, northern cod, New England groundfish, bluefin tuna and Atlantic swordfish 
(Buckworth 1998). From the global perspective there is a consensus that there is an urgent need 
for improved fisheries management. There are a lot of goals of fisheries management but all of 
Co-management in Trao reef Marine Reserve, Vietnam – A transaction costs approach 
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them are leading to use resource sustainability. There are some ways to approach fisheries 
management, depend on management’s objectives, and these objectives have changed over time 
(example: Larkin, 1977 chose maximum sustainable yield (MSY), Roedel 1975 used Maximum 
economic yield (MEY) and optimal sustainable yield (OSY) (Berkes, et al 2001)). It is more 
clearly in this figure: 
 
Figure 1: Fisheries yields and objectives 
Source: adapted from Caddy and Mahon 1995 (Berkes, et al, 2001) 
MSY looks at the biological to measure of harvested fish, based on information from stock 
assessment. MSY research still do not coordinate human predatory behaviour adequately. Berkes, 
et al (2001) affirmed that “MSY is a dominated approach, which is coordinated with command-
and-control input regulations that the harvest sector seeks to circumvent, therefore, raising costs 
of administration and enforcement to obtain compliance”.  
MEY is biologically more conservative than MSY. Economic measures which include taxes and 
quotas, is used in fisheries management. Hardin (1968) said that MEY seeks the rent 
maximization from the fishery and therefore the total economic benefit to society while 
preventing the “tragedy of the commons” (Berkes, et al, 2001). The Lecture Notes on Fisheries 
Economics and Management, The Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Tromso, 
Norway in 2010 also affirmed that in the open-access the maximum sustainable yield stock level, 
XMSY,  may be below, above or equal to stock level, X∞, whereas the rent maximizing stock 
level, XMEY, is always above the MSY level. It is showed in Figure 1 that increased fishing 
effort leading to erode both rent and biological viability. There is also consensus that property 
rights are important in managing fisheries. Open access (OA) is undesirable and to ignore 
Co-management in Trao reef Marine Reserve, Vietnam – A transaction costs approach 
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management at the communal level is a very important oversight. Managing fisheries using best 
available information relates not only to biology and economics but also to the cultural, social, 
and political components of the fisheries system is an obligation (Berkes et al, 2001). Optimum 
Sustainable Yield (OSY) mixed all components to arrive at yield targets depend on management 
objectives that are broader than MEY and MSY. Berkes et al (2001) also said that the idea of 
optimal yield from a fishery revealed that the benefits is derived from fisheries could be 
measured in many ways other than simply the weight or the landed value of the catch (Roedel 
1975). The trouble is that multiple objectives are messy and OSY rather vague. Maximizing for a 
single objective is much easier than optimization. The fishery resources are under common 
property or open access situations with the top-down management regime. The overexploitation 
and degradation are often subject in management regime due to over-capitalization, inefficient 
technologies and lack of proper management (Pomeroy, 1998) A key fisheries management issue 
is the lack of progress with the fishing capacity reduction and related harmful subsidies. A further 
and important reason to promote capacity building occurs where regional co-operation and 
collaboration underpin the implementation of agreements (FAO, 2008).  
1.1.2.  Solutions to deal with the fisheries mismanagement in the world 
In summary, there was not an appropriate management scheme during the fishing industry’s rapit 
development and this has led to the problem of over-fishing and finally depletion in fishery 
resources as outlined in the above analysis. In open-access fishery, because of no guarantee that 
if fishermen do not fish today, they can catch tomorrow, therefore they catch as much as possible 





























































CPUE (tons/HP/year) Total engine capacity
 
Figure 2   : Catch per unit effort related to engine capacity 
(Source: Ministry of fisheries, 2006) 
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Where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, does not lead to profit maximization in open-
access fishery. Instead, equilibrium will be reached where average revenue equals average cost 
(i.e. total cost equals total revenue). In open-access, scenarios fish abundance is getting degraded 
and this leads to less fish being available for future generations. Various attempts have been 
carried out in order to manage fisheries such that we can optimize exploitation of fishery 
resources. It is often found conventional fishery regulations involve both renewing resource 
abundance (including closed season, closed area, and gear restriction) and control on fishing 
effort (including limited license, individual fish quota, and taxation).  
Arnason (1990) suggested that fisheries management may be classed in to two groups: biological 
fisheries management and economic fisheries management.  
 
Figure 3: Fisheries management systems: classification  
(Source: Handbook Of Operations Research In Natural Resources, Part II, chapter 9: fishery 
management, page 166) 
 
Biological fisheries management included “mesh size regulations, total allowable catch, area 
closures, nursery ground protection and so on, may conserve and even enhance the fish stocks” 
(Arnason, 1990). As a presentation in Figure 3, economic fisheries management may be included 
two types: direct and indirect. The indirect economic management may be detail divided into 
taxes and property rights.  
Co-management in Trao reef Marine Reserve, Vietnam – A transaction costs approach 
 




Figure 4: The sustainable fisheries model 
(Source: Handbook Of Operations Research In Natural Resources, Part II, chapter 9: fishery 
management, page 159) 
 
The analysis about the biological fisheries management mentions about effect of total allowable 
catches (TACs). The fishery is beginning at a competitive equilibrium without profits and the 
fishing effort is at point ec (total costs equals total revenues). TAC restriction is enforced by effort 
limitations. When the effort is les than ec, it showed that the fishery will become profitable (the 
revenue curve is above the cost curve). Companies try to raise the fishing effort to get more 
profits. The more vessels that were built the less profits was shared. Therefore, the TAC 
restriction is maintained, the operating time of the fleet will have to be shorted further and so on 
and finally, a new equilibrium been established, sustainable fishing may have raised and 
improvement of fish stocks. “However, what really counts, the profits, that is net economic 
benefits of the fishery will be not different as before, equal zero”, Arnason, 1990 said that. A lot 
of the same applies to direct economic restrictions like limitations on fishing time, days at sea, 
engine size, number of vessels, holding capacity of the vessels, and so on. It is the same as 
biological fisheries management, the failure of these methods is to generate economic rents 
because they do not remove the common property nature of the fishery. Consequently, TAC can 
not solve the conflict between the fishermen, they continue in the catch through expansion of the 
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fisheries inputs that are not controlled. Within the setting and enforcing of biological and 
economic fisheries restrictions, it is easy to see that this is always costly, to control. In 
conclusion, these fisheries management methods – biological fisheries management and direct 
economic restrictions – may be worse than nothing because biological and economic restrictions 
do not create any economic benefits, at least not in the long run, these costs of management show 
a net economic loss.  
As Figure 3, Indirect economic fisheries management divided into taxation and various types of 
private property rights. The appropriate taxation included tax on landing, tax on fishing inputs, 
make the fishing industry operate in the social optimal way.  
 
Figure 5: The effect of tax on landings 
(Source: Handbook Of Operations Research In Natural Resources, Part II, chapter 9: fishery 
management, page 168) 
 
From Figure 5, it is presented that the taxes can do this by reducing revenues or increasing the 
costs of fishing. However, there are some technical and social problems with using  taxes 
(Arnason, 1990). The managing of fisheries by means of taxes has not been used further in any 
significant ocean fishery. There are some ways to manage fisheries resource that apply property 
rights-based regimes, especially ITQ systems, this approach based on property rights to attempt 
to eliminate the common property problem by establishing private property rights over the fish 
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stocks. Some types of property rights regimes included: fishing licenses, sole ownership, 
territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs), individual catch quotas and community fishing rights 
(Arnason, 1990). Fishing licenses is the right to capture or aquaculture, constitute a property 
right. Indeed, under those issues, TURFs are seem the same as sole ownership and should lead to 
full economic efficiency. Arnason showed empirical studies seem to affirm this prediction 
(Panayoutou,1984). However, with migratory stocks that periodically migrate in and out of the 
TURF-area, the effectiveness of TURFs is much decreased. In fact, the indications are that the 
stock does not have to spend much time outside the TURF to create huge decreases in the 
applicability of this method. Individual quotas have been applied around the world with a 
suitable degree of success. Individual transferable quotas or ITQs was understood as transferable 
and perfectly divisible catch quotas. If the ITQs were also permanent they establish a complete 
property right just like a building or a piece of land (Arnason, 1990). There are two ways, ITQs 
do this essentially in: secure rights to a certain quantity of harvest and ITQs further economic 
efficiency is by quota trades. Given quota tradability this leads to only the most efficient fishing 
firms to operate in the fishery. The less efficient or inefficient firms will sell their quota and leave 
the fishery. Thus, under an ITQ system, there will be a convergence to the optimal use of overall 
fishing capital and fishing effort and to the most efficient fishing firms operating in the fishery. 
Shotton has been verified this prediction in empirical studies of actual ITQ fisheries (Shotton, 
2000) and it is verified in a lot of empirical studies (references in Shotton 2000). However, the 
ITQ system will not automatically lead to full efficiency in fisheries. The quota price is one of 
the most visible outcomes of a quota system, that is the price by which quotas are traded in the 
market is leading to the same with the tax on landings in above discussion. The main  
disadvantage of communal fishing rights as a way towards good fisheries management is that this 
simply may not happen. Arnason, 1990 confirmed that reorganization that community fishing 
rights do not constitute an FMS is important. They simply showed that devolution of the 
authority of fisheries management from a higher level to a lower level. “The community will still 
have to deal with the problem of establishing and implementing a good FMS”, Arnason (1990), 
said that. The management system adopted can easily be just as inefficient as the one preceding 
the community rights. Thus, in order to increase the probability of success, it is required that the 
communities have the ability to exclude new members, the rights allocated to the communities 
should be as high quality as possible, the communities should include homogenous group of 
fishermen as possible and the communities should, if at all possible, be set up so that each 
member’s pay-off is an increasing function of the aggregate pay-off. It can be represented that if 
these four conditions are met, there is a high probability that the fisheries community will 
Co-management in Trao reef Marine Reserve, Vietnam – A transaction costs approach 
 
Nguyen Thi Hoa Hong, NOMA FAME 2008 - 2010 
 
12
manage fisheries in an efficient manner. Other advantages of communal fishing rights is that they 
often facilitate effective enforcement of fisheries management rules on the basis of social and 
socially acceptable, social group pressure and physical proximity. (Handbook Of Operations 
Research In Natural Resources).  
Due to the poor management system under the open access scenario, coastal resources have been 
overexploited and damaged by damaged fishing methods and environmental pollution (Vũ Trung 
Tạng, 1994, Ha Xuan Thong, 1998). This is in response to the failure of centralised management 
in the need and search for improved approach and performance in resource conservation and 
sustainability. It also is getting more awareness that resources can be better managed when 
fishermen and other stakeholders are directly involved in resource management process and use 
rights are located, either individually or collectively (Pomeroy, 2000). In New Zealand, 
fishermen have a very strong position in fisheries management (Jentoft and McCay, 1995; 
Hersoug, 2002). There are some other strategies being used around the world in fisheries 
management like consultative, co-operative, community-based and absolutely bottom-up local 
management systems (Jentoft and McCay, 1995; Sen and Nielsen, 1996; Pomeroy, 1998). Nearly 
all small-scale fishing communities develop systems of community-based management, which 
can be distinguished from other management that is instituted by government authority (FAO, 
2000). Coastal community issues and problems are multi-faceted and must therefore be 
addressed an integrated manner. The primary concerns of fisheries management should focus on 
the relationship of the resources to human welfare and the conservation of the resources for use 
by future generations (Pomeroy, 1995). Thus the effective management requires 
multidisciplinary knowledge emphasizing not only on biological aspects but also on socio-
economic issues. Opposite of the top down system, bottom up regime starts at the local level. 
Therefore, the sustainable fisheries are only achievable through collaborative planning strategies, 
which is combined by the top-down and bottom-up regime as well as governance system. Rather, 
it must find ways enabling and creating the conditions for sustainable development based more 
on local resources skills and knowledge. Fishers, the day-to-day managers, have to be equal and 
active participants in resource management (Pomeroy, 2000). This system is called community 
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1.2. Overview of Vietnamese Fisheries  
1.2.1. Resources 
From final report of Vietnam fisheries and aquaculture sector study (2005) showed that Vietnam 
has a land area of 329,200 km² and an exclusive economic zone of about 1 million km². There are 
4 main regions in the sea areas of Viet Nam namely northern, central, southeast and southwest as 
shown in Table 1. Current fish stock estimates total almost 4.2 million tons and a total allowable 
catch (TAC) or Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is about 1.67 million tonnes per year (The 
TAC in Vietnam is used the same with the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MYS) in other countries 
because of the problems with mixed catches, it is very difficult to estimate specific stocks for 
protection and setting of Total Allowable Catch (TACs).. Biomass has recently been re-
estimated. Although the data have yet to be made official by MOFI, it is likely that biomass 
estimates will be reduced to around 3 million tons and MSY to 1.4 million tons. The official 
estimates of marine fisheries resources are included in Appendix A (source: Ministry of Finance, 
2004)       
Table 1: Biomass and estimated MSY 
 
 
There are 2,038 fish species in Viet Nam’s seas with more than 130 commercial species. 
Depending on the biological and ecological characteristics, fish species can be distributed into 
four groups: pelagic fish, the small pelagic fish, the demersal fish. The big pelagic fish are the 
main targeted species of Vietnam’s offshore fisheries with high economic value. They included 
tuna; Swordfish; Marlin; Mahi Mahi; Indo pacific Spanish mackerel; Wahoo; Narrow barred 
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Spanish mackerel, … (RIMF, 2001). The small pelagic fishes are abundant in three coastal areas 
of Viet Nam (the North, Centre, and South). They spawn near the shore in March and April. 
There are 260 species (both the small and big pelagic fishes). (RIMF, 2001). The demersal fish 
also have high economic value. Most of them distributed in coastal areas and have small in size. 
They are the major export species among marine fishes of Vietnam and the targeted species of 
bottom trawlers. They are  about of 69% of total number of species in Vietnamese waters, equal 
1,432 species as Speckled tongue sole; Largehead hairtail; Long spine seabream; Black pomfret; 
Silver pomfret; Silver croaker; Silver grunt; Bully mullet; Goldband goatfish; Pale-edged 
stingray, etc. (RIMF, 2001). The coral reef fishes are group fish species which their habitation is 
in coral reefs. They are colorful and diversity animals. They are about of 16% of the total number 
of species in Vietnamese waters (340 species) (RIMF, 2001).  
Because the Vietnam Sea belongs to the tropical environment therefore it has specific 
characteristics as:  
Oceanography:  Tropical and high temperature; 
Biology:   High species richness, high biodiversity; 
Fisheries:   Mixed species fisheries.  
There have been many projects for assessing stock in the Vietnam Sea by many researchers such 
as Menavesta (1973), Nguyen Van Boi (1976), Pham Thuoc (1984), Bui Dinh Chung (1978, 
1981), Le Trong Phan (1985), Bui Dinh Chung, Chu Tien Vinh and Ngyen Huu Duc (2001). But 
the results are very different (Table 2) 
Table 2: The demersal stock and TAC of Vietnamese marine waters 
 Stock (tons) TAC (tons) Researchers, year 
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1.2.2. Fishing labors 
The human resources in Viet Nam are abundant and assiduous. This is advantage for fisheries 
and other fields. The fisheries sector created a lot of jobs, both directly through employment on 
boats and farms, and indirectly in upstream and downstream activities such as processing. Direct 
employment in the sector is estimated at 555,000, at present and has been growing at around 
26,000 per year. (FICEN) 
 
Table 3:  Fisheries labor (thousands) 
 
 
However, the fisheries development is not sustainable. It is very difficult for the Government to 
reduce the number of fishing boats to develop sustainable fisheries while the education level of 
fishermen is low. Specifically, only 10% of them graduated from high school, 20% have primary 
education while 68% did not or less than and just 0.65% graduated from vocational schools or 
universities. Therefore, fishermen have no alternatives to fishing. (Vietnamese Ministry of 
Fisheries, 2006).  Few women are involved in fishing. It is found that only 1.4% of fishing 
workers are women, and these are all shore-based (Dang & Ruckes, 2003). However, women 
often own fishing vessels or fleets and some of the larger private fleets as an example in Kien 
Giang are owned and managed by women. Women usually prepared materials for fishing trips, 
for gear repair, sorting fish landed and fish retailing in local markets.  
1.2.3. Fishing fleets 
The final report for Viet Nam fisheries and aquaculture (2005) showed that the number of 
mechanized vessels has increased rapidly from 29,584 in 1981 to 44,000 in 1991, to 77,000 in 
2002 (by an average of 4.6% per year) and this number was 85,914 in 2005.  The average power 
of the vessels has increased by 12%/year to reach 48 horsepower (hp) in 2002. There are 
different about horsepower of vessel between different areas in Viet Nam. The engine power of 
southern vessels averaged over 90hp, compared to 30hp for the rest of the country. Of the 
mechanized vessels, almost 7,000 operated in off-shore with engines of over 90hp. The average 
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of horsepower in vessel has increased rapidly. In 1991, only 10% of mechanized vessels 
exceeded 45hp, this number is 27% in 2001 and increased more than 30% in 2004. The main 
increase in size class has been in the over 75hp and 46- 75hp classes. There were 453,871 Hp in 
1981, this number was 4,721,701 in 2004. It means that the engine capacity is increasing at a rate 
of 164,579 Hp/year. Vessels with engines less than 20hp decreased from almost 60% of the fleet 
to 25% in 2005. The offshore fleet, which is generally classified as including vessels with 
engines exceeding 90hp, are now around 6,000. Among the main gears, trawling (both pair and 
single) predominates in the south with around 40% of vessels. The increasing number of fishing 
boats and total engine capacity implied more fishing effort and more pressure on the fisheries 
resources, lead to over-exploitation of the marine resources. Trawling threatens to damage 
marine resources, fishing grounds, and marine ecosystems (Jennings et al. 2001, Kaiser et al). 
Vietnam has about 21,641 trawlers, occupied 25% of total number of fishing boats. The trawlers 
often operate in coastal areas lead to damage to the seabed where many species dwell. Trawling 
is also major factor of degradation marine environment (Dong, N.V. 2000). In some other 
countries, like China, the Government banned trawling in inshore waters. However, this is still a 
big problem in Viet Nam, which is difficult to solve because most of fishers and millions of 
people are very poor and they fish for subsistence. Thus, it is difficult to ban this effective fishing 
method. Most of the fishing boats are very small. There are 82,5 (90%) boats under 20 meters in 
length. In addition, the engine capacity and the speed of fishing boats are low, making them 
unable to withstand high waves and strong winds. In fact they are vulnerable to bad weather 
(Source: Vietnamese Ministry of Fisheries, 2005)  
1.2.4. The catch 
Together with the increasing number of fishing boats and the total engine capacity the catch has 
also been unceasingly growing annually whilst catch per unit effort (CPUE) is declining. 
The marine fisheries sector in Vietnam has developed rapidly over recent years. Total landings 
increased from around 0.5 million tons in 1980 to 0.8 million tons in 1990 1,7 million tons in 
2004 and 2 millions in 2006, the average productivity (ton/Hp/year) tended to decrease, 
especially since 1985 (FICEN, 2007). Fish landings have raised at 5%/year, crustaceans at 
10%/year and mollusks by an average of 16%/year from a low base. Of total marine capture 
landings in 2003, the south contributed 55%, 28% in south central and 11% in north central. 
There is no single accurate measure for assessing the productivity of the marine fishing fleet in 
Vietnam. The measure most commonly used is catch per horsepower for the mechanized vessels 
which is not accurate particularly during a period of rapid mechanization and increase in power. 
Nonetheless, catch per unit effort has declined from the peak of 1.11 ton/Hp/year in 1985 to 0.7 
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t/hp/y in 1993 to about 0.4 t/hp/y in 2003, indicate the rapid declination in productivity in relation 
to unit effort. A number of the fishing gears in Vietnam have high catches of trash fish. Edwards 
(2004) pointed that trash fish occupied about 33% of total marine fish landings. Southern 
fisheries had the highest proportion of trash fish (averaging around 60% of the catch), compared 
to 5% in central, and 14% in northern regions. Qualities of fishes are often low because salt is 
usually used for preservation as opposed to ice. Trash fish landings are likely to increase in the 
future, unless trawl net designs reduce catches of small fish. The productivity (CPUE) obtained 
from the peak of 1.11 ton/Hp/year in 1985 and only around 0.35 ton/Hp/year in 2003 and 0.04 
ton/Hp/year reducing annually (RIMF, 2005). The by catch was up to 30% (for offshore trawling) 
and 60% (inshore trawling) of the total catch, (Luong, N.T, 2003).  
In addition, because of the resource decline, excessive number of fishing boats, both fishing 
productivity and income of each unit have reduced constantly. The uncontrolled increase of  
fishing effort development has caused the marine resources to decrease and caused the extinction 
of commercially important species, example: shrimp, giant tiger prawn, etc. The quality of fish 
products has also decreased, the percentage of trash fish has increased and the proportion of 
valuable fishes has been declined, and the profit of fisheries has fallen (Dong, NV, 2001, Tinh, 
H.V, 2004).  
The catch is increasing lead to over-fishing, overexploitation and destroying the biodiversity and 
habitat.  
1.2.5. The value of fisheries export 
Both of volume and price in capture fisheries and aquaculture products are increasing lead to 
raise the fisheries exportation turnover, from 205 million USD in 1990 to more than 3.3 billions 
USD (See in Table 4), and 4,5 billions USD in 2008 (Vasep). Annual contribution occupied 1.7% 
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1990  1,019,000 709,000 310,000 205,000 72,723 1,860
1991  1,062,163 714,253 347,910 262,234 72,043 2,100
1992  1,097,830 746,570 351,260 305,630 83,972 2,350
1993  1,116,169 793,324 368,604 368,435 93,147 2,570
1994  1,211,496 878,474 333,022 458,200 93,672 2,810
1995  1,344,140 928,860 415,280 550,100 95,700 3,030
1996  1,373,500 962,500 411,000 670,000 97,700 3,120
1997  1,570,000 1,062,000 481,000 776,000 71,500 3,200
1998  1,668,530 1,130,660 537,870 858,600 71,799 3,350
1999  1,827,310 1,212,800 614,510 971,120 73,397 3,380
2000  2,003,000 1,280,590 723,110 1,478,609 79,768 3,400
2001  2,226,900 1,347,800 879,100 1,777,485 78,978 Unknown
2002  2,410,900 1,434,800 976,100 2,014,000 81,800 Unknown
2003  2,536,361 1,426,223 1,110,138 2,199,577 83,122 Unknown
2004  3,073,600 1,923,500 1,150,100 2,400,781 85,430 Unknown
2005  3,432,800 1,995,400 1,437,400 2,738,726 90,880 Unknown
2006  3,695,927 2,001,656 1,694,271 3,357,960 Unknown Unknown
2007 4,160,000 2,060,000 2,100,000 3,702,000 
2008 4,580,000 2,130,000 2,450,000 4,500,000 >130,000 >5,000
(Source: Vietnamese Ministry of Fisheries, 2006 and VASEP 2010)  
1.2.6. The management systems 
MOFI (now MARD) is the main Government body responsible for protecting and developing 
fishery resources. MOFI is responsible for defining (i) TAC and fishing capacity, (ii) protection 
measures relating to the marine environment and living resources; and (iii) zoning, monitoring 
and research. MOFI also issues and withdraws fishing permits. The set up of fisheries 
management system in Vietnam is fairly voluminous from Ministry of agriculture and rural 
development to office (commune) but due to lack of economic resources the required manpower 
are not sufficient. Most of the human resources were graduated from universities or colleges. 
However, the enforcement some times is not up to the mark, specially the monitoring on the sea, 
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Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Government) 
 
Agriculture and Rural Development Service (Provinces) 
 
Agriculture and Rural Development department (Districts) 
 
Agriculture and Rural Development office (communes) 
 
Figure 6:  Set up of fisheries management system in Vietnam 
(Source: MARD, 2010) 
Up to now, Vietnam’s Government has issued one Ordinance of Marine Resources Protection in 
1989, one Fisheries Law in 2003 and many fisheries regulations in order to control the fisheries 
sector. Besides this, the Ministry of Fisheries and MARD (now) has issued many standards of 
fisheries such as fishing gear standard, the minimum length of fish allowable catch, ect. Example 
Coastal zone fishing with 10 meters in depth or far from the coastline 3.2 miles, in-shore fishing 
with 10 - 30 meters in depth or far from the coastline 3.2 - 8.6 miles, off-shore fishing with the 
depth of the sea is over 30 meters or in areas located 8.6 miles or more from the coast line, 
requirement about mesh size of fishing gear; the minimum size of allowable catch, forbid some 
kind of destructive fishing gears such as estuary set net, scoop net and chemicals; to forbid the 
fishing for 21 species without the time-limit for example Pteria maxima, Tenualosa toli, Anguilla 
bicolor Pacifica, Chitala and to forbid the fishing for 19 species with the time-limit.  
Traditionally, fisheries management in has been the responsibility of the government. However, 
agencies such as DOFI have lacked the resources of staff and budget to provide the required 
management, monitoring, surveillance or enforcement of Vietnam’s inshore (or offshore) waters. 
With increasing population pressure and the development of more effective (and/or destructive) 
fishing gears, inshore resources have been raising over exploited or destroyed. In this case, 
almost the only option for improved fisheries management is co-management, the sharing of 
responsibility and authority for fisheries management between local communities and 
government agencies. This approach is easier when countries have a tradition of resource 
ownership by communities, as in much of the Pacific. In a situation of Vietnam where marine 
resources have traditionally been open access, leading inevitably to a “tragedy of the commons”, 
it is more difficult but not impossible. Vietnam also has some historical community resource 
management regimes in history. Some inland resources were managed by villages (the forest 
resources is an example) or by some ethnic minority groups. However, even where inshore 
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resources are shared, rights can be allocated if the national legislative framework is adequate. 
The new fisheries law provides the basis for provinces to develop co-management systems with 
local communities. 
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Chapter II   
LITERATURE FRAMEWORK 
 
This section reviews the definition of MPAs as well as the role of MPAs, theory of community-
based coastal resources management, co-management, fishery co-management and the 
transaction costs in fishery co-management, as well as experiences about the transaction costs 
measurement in co-management from the other countries, especially from some countries which 
have similar characteristics to Vietnam. 
2.1. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 
Over-fishing is a major problem in the world where, by 2007 estimate, 52 percent of the fish 
stocks were fully exploited and about 20 percent of the stock groups monitored by FAO were 
underexploited (2 percent) or moderately exploited (18 percent). The other 28 percent were either 
overexploited (19 percent), depleted (8 percent) or recovering from depletion (1 percent). The 
status of full exploitation and deletion of world fisheries indicates a need for better governance 
(FAO, 2008). 
To conserve and restore the high-value species and/or habitats, marine reserves are established 
(Kelleher, 1996; Dayton et al., 2000). Marine protected areas (MPAs) have been used as an 
efficient tool to manage the fisheries resource for over 40 years (Wood, 2008). The IUCN (1999) 
defines the marine protected areas as: “Any area of  intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its 
overlaying water and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been 
reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment”. 
According to Noella J. Gray, Marine protected areas (MPAs) are rapidly transforming the 
international seascape, changing both ideas and practices regarding management of the marine 
commons. In 1970, there were 118 legally designated MPAs (MPAs) in the world; by 1985 this 
number had increased to 430, by 1994 it was 1306 (Kelleher 1999), and in 2005, the estimated 
number of MPAs worldwide was 4600 (Wood, 2008). Although they cover only a small 
percentage of the world’s oceans, MPAs are concentrated along coastlines where they impact 
fishers, the tourism industry, and other resource users. MPAs, therefore play an important role in 
world fisheries. A form of enclosure, MPAs represent a range of property/governance regimes, 
including traditional/customary sea tenure, community-based management, co-management, 
centralized/state management and private management (Christie and White 2007). Despite 
various regimes, these MPAs are managed under two types of management: conventional 
centralized management (top-down approach) and co-management with participation of local 
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communities (bottom-up approach). Francis et al (2002) has also pointed out that the success of 
MPAs in management context in Eastern Africa is attributable to the involvement of local people 
in management and planning as well as involvement of NGOs and private sectors.  
2.2. Co-management 
2.2.1. What is co-management? 
Jentoft (1989) also argued that the lack of legitimacy in the top-down management regimes has 
caused, to some degree, the current crisis in fishery management  
The traditional approach to fisheries management by national governments worldwide has been 
to establish fishery laws and regulations, which then had to be enforced. With the top-down 
management regime, fishery resources are under common property or open access situations and 
are often subject to overexploitation and degradation due to over capitalization, inefficient 
technologies and lack of proper management (Pomeroy, 1998). 
Hersoug and Rånes also said that basic realization and idea is that, highly centralized, top-down 
management systems are not working properly, and that new approaches have to be found in 
order to manage resources on a sustainable basis.  
Gray said that in complex systems such as the ocean, where assumptions of (relatively) complete 
biological knowledge do not hold and resource boundaries can be difficult to define, co-
management is considered to be the best strategy (Baland and Platteau 1996; Pinkerton 1989; 
Singleton 2000; Wilson 2002).  
Co-management (or collaborative management) is ‘the term given to governance systems that 
combine state control with local, decentralized decision making and accountability and which, 
ideally, combine the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of each.’ (Singleton, 1998). The 
World Bank has defined co-management as ‘the sharing of responsibilities, rights and duties 
between the primary stakeholders, in particular, local communities and the nation state; a 
decentralized approach to decision-making that involves the local users in the decision-making 
process as equals with the nation-state’ (The World Bank, 1999: 11). In essence this is the same 
definition as the one adopted by the World Conservation Congress, Resolution 1.42: ‘a 
partnership in which government agencies, local communities and resource users, 
nongovernmental organizations and other stakeholders negotiate, as appropriate to each context, 
the authority and responsibility for the management of a specific area or set of resources’ (IUCN, 
1996). It should be noted that this latter definition regards the State as only one among a set of 
stakeholders. Co-management also can be understood as ‘a situation in which two or more social 
actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management 
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functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural resources’ 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000: 1). 
 
Figure 7:  Stakeholder categories and co-management 
(source: The World Bank, 1999:11) 
 
Pomeroy (1998) affirmed that "co-management is a middle course between state-level concerns 
on fisheries management for efficiency and equity and local concerns for self governance, self-
regulation and active participation. The strategy to alternate the “top-down” policy making in 
fishery management is the community self-regulation of fishery resources. The active 
involvement by the community and the legal support of the government (local and national) in 
the protection of fishery resources can enhance the harvests in sustainable ways. And co-
management involves various degrees of delegation of management responsibility and authority 
between the local community and the government. This process will depend upon specific 
conditions of country or local. However, in all cases of co-management, the ultimate authority is 
held by the government (Pomeroy, 1995). Figure 8 shows a hierarchy of co-management 
arrangements. In the hierarchy, co-management is in middle between government-based 
management and user group-based management. Co-management seeks to harmonize the 
government concerns in fisheries management for efficiency and equity, and local community 
concerns for self-regulation and active participation. Consequently, co-management becomes an 
appropriate mechanism for both fisheries management and for community and economic 
development by the set of strategies in order to encourage participation of community in actively 
solving problems and addressing needs 
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Figure 8:  Spectrum of co management arrangements  
(adapted from McCay 1993 and Berkes 1994) 
(Source: Sen.S and J.R.Nielsen, 1996) 
 
Jentoft et al. (1998) defined co-management as the collaborative and participatory process of 
regulatory decision-making among representatives of user groups, government agencies, and 
research institutions. In terms of which stakeholders make decisions in management, there are 
two extremes: state power and fishermen’s power. In top-down management, government 
decides and act unilaterally to which user groups adhere as receivers: meanwhile, in co-
management user groups have full control and organize and run their own management systems. 
The decision making ladder has several steps, according to the degree of fisher influence in the 
policy-making process. 
Nielsen (1996) indicates that co-management as an arrangement where responsibility for 
resource management is shared between the government and user groups is considered to be a 
solution to the growing problems of resource overexploitation. It is a dynamic partnership using 
the capacity and interest of user groups complemented by the ability of the fisheries 
administrators to provide enabling legislation. As such a co-management arrangement is not a 
static legal structure of rights and rules, but a dynamic process of creating new institutional 
structures. Thus the anticipated outcome is sustainability, efficiency and equity of the resource 
use. 
Furthermore, co-management refers to “the sharing of power and responsibility between the 
government and local resource users” (Berkes, George, and Preston 1991: 12). Two of the 
commonly cited factors in favor of co-management include: (1) local knowledge and scientific 
knowledge, when combined, offer a more complete picture; and (2) monitoring and enforcement 
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will be more effective because they will have local legitimacy, while still remaining accountable 
to state oversight (Singleton 2000). These factors make co-management an appropriate 
institutional arrangement for most MPAs, rather than state or community-based management 
(e.g. Jones 2002, 2006; Rudd et al. 2003). 
2.2.2. Fishery co- management 
Multiple co-management definitions consequently lead to a lot of definitions of fisheries co-
management. Abdullah, et at showed that fisheries co-management is defined as the sharing of 
responsibility and authority between the government and the community of local fishers to 
manage a fishery (Pomeroy and Williams 1994; Sen and Nielsen 1996).  
Abdullah also affirmed that fisheries co-management can be defined as a partnership 
arrangement in which government, the community of local resource users (fishers), external 
agents (nongovernmental organizations, academic and research institutions), and other fisheries 
and coastal resource stakeholders (boat owners, fish traders, money lenders, tourism 
establishments, etc.) share the responsibility and authority for decision making over the 
management of a fishery (Pomeroy & Williams, 1994; Sen & Nielsen, 1996; Pomeroy et al., 
1999; Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2006). 
With Brown, et at, 1999, fisheries co-management, as a process of participation, empowerment, 
power sharing, dialogue, conflict management and knowledge generation, holds potential as an 
alternative fisheries management strategy for the region. Survey data shows a strong preference 
among fishers for co-management. Co-management will, however, involve the establishment of 
new fisher organizations, institutional arrangements, and laws and policies to support 
decentralization, fisher participation in management, and partnerships for management. 
The analysis of Sen, et at (1996) also said that fisheries co-management is defined as an 
arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the government 
and user groups. It is considered to be one solution to the growing problems of resource over-
exploitation (Jentoft, 1989; Nielsen, 1995; Berkes, 1989; Hanna, 1992) 
2.2.3. Advantages and obstacles of fisheries co-management 
a, Advantages 
From the above co-management concepts and analysis about fisheries co-management, it is easy 
to see the advantages of fisheries co-management like the combination of indigenous local and 
scientific knowledge, and more effective and feasible management through local legitimacy. In 
addition, the responsibility toward sustainability is increased through the co-management model. 
Another advantage is that with co-management, the monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) 
cost is reduced. Finally, the most important advantage in co-management regime is that all of 
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stakeholders benefit from co-management, not only the direct user groups but also environmental 
activist, government managers, research institutions and others. 
b, Obstacles  
Although co-management is considered an efficient way to manage the natural resources in 
general and the fisheries in particular, it nevertheless have some obstacles in application. The 
first is that the stakeholders who may be most enthusiastic about co-management are likely those 
who would have more to gain, whereas stakeholders with certain advantages in the current 
situation may not be willing to embrace co-management, fearing, for example, the loss of power 
and existing privilege. Some stakeholders may be not willing to commit at an early stage of pre-
implementation, especially if the process of implementation is long, and therefore leads them to 
think that co-management might not happen. For the pre-implementation of co-management, this 
pose a clear challenge since participation of stakeholders in these different positions may be 
required (Ratana, 2007).  
Secondly, co-management is very time–consuming work and it requires the fisher’s management 
skills and the fishermen have to associate in dealing with complex and changing situations in 
implementing the co-management system. For instance, a community-based coastal resource 
management project in Orion (in the Philippines) started in 1990 which is supposed to terminate 
after 2004 (Mulekom, 1999). 
Thirdly, there is a lack of empirical knowledge mentioned about actual costs and benefit. And the 
finally, the legal framework for co-management is high, particularly in developing countries 
where an open access nature of fisheries resources is dominant. Co-management in Norway and 
Japan are examples of the co-management on the national levels (Jentoft, 1985; Ruddle, 1987; 
Lim et al., 1995), and both of them have a legal basis.  
2.2.4. The successful co-managed conditions 
Pinkerton (1989) and Ostrom (1990, 1992) recognize the key successful conditions for a co-
management regime. Those conditions are presented in Pomeroy and Williams (1994) and then 
reviewed under the Asian context for co-management of fishery by Pomeroy et al. 1998 as 
follows: 
1. Clearly defined boundary 
2. Membership is clearly defined 
3. Group cohesion  
4. Existing organization  
5. Benefits exceed costs 
6. Participation by those affected 
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7. Management rules enforced 
8. Legal rights to organize 
9. Co-operation and leadership at community level 
10. Decentralization and delegation of authority 
11. Co-ordination between government and community 
And further in detail, Pomeroy et al. (1998) affirmed 28 principles and conditions of co-
management in fisheries under Asian contexts as follows:  
1. Individual incentive structure 
2. Recognition of resource management problems 
3. Leadership  
4. Stakeholder involvement  
5. Empowerment  
6. Trust between partners  
7. Property rights over the resources 
8. Local political support  
9. Capability building  
10. Organizations  
11. Conflict management  
12. External agents  
13. Clear objectives from a well-defined set of issues 
14. Effective communication  
15. Political and social stability 
16. Networking and advocacy 
17. Enabling policies and legislation 
18. Provision of financial resources/budget 
19. Government agency support 
20. Fit with existing and traditional social and cultural institutions and structures of 
21. Partner sense of ownership of the co-management process 
22. Effective enforcement 
23. Partnerships and contractual agreements 
24. Overlap of interests 
25. Flexibility 
26. Appropriate scale 
27. Coordinating body 
Co-management in Trao reef Marine Reserve, Vietnam – A transaction costs approach 
 
Nguyen Thi Hoa Hong, NOMA FAME 2008 - 2010 
 
28
28. Social preparation and value formation 
2.3.  Transaction costs in Fisheries co-management 
In this section, transaction costs are discribed, along with how is transaction costs are measured, 
and their meaning in managing fisheries, in particular and in natural resource in general.  
An axiom in the business world is “what gets measured gets managed”. Analyses of public 
policies is necessary to include transaction costs, as well as transformation costs, and to be 
included, they must be measured. It is important to note that transaction costs can be substantial 
(McCann et al, 2005). Coase, 1988 affirmed that “without the concept of transaction costs, which 
is largely absent from current economic theory, it is my contention that it is impossible to 
understand the working of the economic system, to analyze many of its problems in a useful way, 
or to have a basis for determining policy” 
And McCann, et al (2005) also said that  Coase’s seminal paper, 1937 “ The Nature of the Firm” 
was the first paper to mention transaction costs, especially as related to the firm as well as public 
policy issues (Coase, 1960).  
A lot of definitions of transaction costs are presented in the literature such as Williamson (1973, 
1975, 1981), Randall (1972), Dahlman (1979), North (1990), Davis (1986), Barzel (1989), Allen 
(1991), Zerbe and McCurdy (1999), and Cheung (1969) (Kuperan et al, 1999). Murshed-e-Jahn 
et al showed that the definition of transaction costs as the costs of running the economic system 
in Arrow’s market failure theory (Arrow, 1970). It is pointed out by Libecap (1991) that having 
lower transaction cost need rather than a sufficient condition for acceptance (McCann et al, 2005) 
Arrow, 1970 also argued that an institution’s existence depends on minimizing the transaction 
costs (Murshed-e-Jahan et al ? year)  
McCann et al, 2005 have similarly stated that it is a necessary  to examine transaction costs when 
the potential of new institutions as alternatives to existing institutions is evaluated. When 
multiple individuals are related to environments where complex activities have to be coordinated 
across space and over time, they may try to reduce the substantial uncertainties that they face 
through various forms of implicit or explicit arrangements (Kuperan et al, 1999). Kuperan et al, 
1999 also said that these contracts involve costly activities used in the process that previously 
achieved agreements and in continuing to co-ordinate activities after uncertain environment can 
reached an beginning agreement. Transaction costs in this paper are defined as the total costs 
involved in developing and running the co- management institution. The main challenge of this 
research is to identify the components of the transaction costs involve in the co-management 
system as well as obstacle to identify this cost in centralized management system in the Trao 
reef, Van Hung commune,Van Ninh district, Khanh Hoa province, Viet Nam.  
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Williamson (1985) identifies the transaction costs as comparative costs of adapting,  planning, 
and monitoring under alternative government structures. Thus, the transaction costs in co-
management of fisheries can be divided into three major cost items: (1) information costs; (2) 
collective fisheries decision-making costs; and (3) collective operational costs The first two items 
are ex ante transaction cost and the latter is as the ex post transaction cost. The schematic flow 




Figure 9:  The schematic flow diagram of the transaction costs in fisheries co-
management 
(source: Kuperan et al, 2008 – adapted from Mustapha et al., 1998) 
 
Information Costs 
Pomeroy (year) affirmed that in any centralized management system or co-management system, 
management information for the system must be collected and organized for decision-making 
(Abdullah et al., 1998). Information is the key factor in the success of a public program in 
general and in fisheries co-management programs in particular. It also depends on the amount 
and types of information available to both participants or resource users and decision-makers. For 
the purposes of this paper , “information” - includes information about the market, the number of 
stakeholders and preferences; about fish catch, size of fish stocks; information about the 
fingerling supplier; information about allocation of resources among stakeholders and other 
interested parties over time. It is costly to search and gain this information is that and they are 
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relative to strategic and co-ordination costs (Abdullah et al., 1998). In co-management system, 
the information can be provided by the fishers on fishing patterns, catches and the status of the 
resource while fishers in centralized management systems might only be focused on maximizing 
their own welfare and they may feel no responsibility to provide information to management 
authorities. Such as scenario lead to higher information costs in centralized management systems 
compared with co-management system.  
Decision -Making costs    
The decision-making costs includes costs to coordinate tasks with local and central authorities, 
deal with fisher’s problems, make policies, participate in meetings, make rules and regulations 
and communicate decisions to the community. 
One of the challenges of a fisheries co-management regime is how to get the fishers to reach 
some level of consensus on certain, contracts or collective actions with regard to resource 
management (Abdullah et al., 1998). The decision making process has some transaction costs, 
which are expected to be higher under a co-management system in the initial stage. 
Operations Costs 
The collective fisheries operations cost is the third major component of transaction costs. There 
are three transaction costs from operations process 1) Monitoring, enforcement and compliance 
costs 2) Resource maintenance costs and 3) Resource distribution costs. Monitoring, enforcement 
and compliance costs include the monitoring of the fisheries rules, guarding, catch record 
management, conflict management and sanction for rule violations (Abdullah et al., 1998). 
Management decisions of fisheries resources involve multiple stakeholders with different interest 
in long term, creating uncertain and interdependent processes. This leads to the transaction costs 
created from the problems of coordination, control and information.  
The main difference between centralized management and co-management is the user 
participation level in designing and implementing the management activities. Kuperan, 2008 
showed in his paper that the expected different level of transaction costs involved for each of the 
management activities under a pure centralized management system compared with a co-
management system with a high level of user participation is shown in Table 5 (Adapted from 
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Table 5: Transaction costs in centralized and co-managed system 
(Source: Mustapha et al., 1998) 
 
2.4. Empirical studies of co-management and transaction costs in Southeast Asia and in 
the world 
Communities-based resource management (CBRM) is developed over the world (Pomeroy, 
1994). A lot of investigations on coastal fisheries management in the Southeast Asian region and 
over the world have demonstrated that when left to their own-devices, fisheries communities, 
under given conditions, can adjust access and enforce rules base on community institutions and 
social practices to use resources of fisheries in a sustainable way (Pomeroy, 1995). In this paper, 
some examples from different parts of the world will be shown. 
In Africa (South Africa):  
One of the key findings of the study of coastal fisheries co-management in South Africa is that 
the national government must shift its position from one of rhetoric to active support for co-
management (Hauck et al, 2001).  
Most government officials require a basic change in behavior and thinking and a move towards 
co-operative and participatory governance styles. The resources have to be allocated to these 
efforts of co-management. The willingness to transfer powers of decision-making and 
management responsibilities to institutions and local stakeholders is a significant challenge and a 
co-management framework has to satisfy that all of negotiations and agreements take place in an 
open and non-threatening environment, drawn on both scientific information and   indigenous 
local knowledge and by all stakeholders. One of the most difficult challenges for government is 
enforcement and rule-making in the area. This devolution of power must be implemented 
simultaneously with the allocation of access rights to users. For successful co-management, 
government must be willing to revisit rules and regulations and provide user groups with an 
opportunity to input into rule-making (Hauck et al, 2001).  
In The Caribbean Community (CARICOM): 
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The countries of the region have a relatively poor record of management in fisheries and the 
necessary of reform fisheries governance is urgent  And in CARICOM region, fisheries co-
management, as a process of participation, dialogue, power sharing, empowerment, conflict 
management and knowledge generation, holds potential as an alternative fisheries management 
strategy for the region (Brown et al, 1999). Co-management establishment is same as with other 
places with new fisher organizations, institutional arrangements, and policies and laws to support 
decentralization, partnerships for management, and fisher participation in management. The 
analysis of the CARICOM situation shows that the major partners - government, fishers and 
NGOs - in any co-management strategy for the CARICOM region are organizationally and 
structurally weak; it also shows that the pilot projects should be initiated in which all 
stakeholders can gain practical experience with co-management and demonstrate to each other 
their commitment to the process, developing trust and credibility (Brown et al, 1999) 
In the Asia (Southeast Asia): 
The Southeast Asia is now realizing the important role that CBRM and co-management system 
can play in future fisheries management and it is seen most extensively applied in the 
Philippines. Since 1991, CBRM has achieved acceptance in the policies of the government 
(Mulekom, 1999). Thailand, Malaysia are other countries also supporting co-management . Each 
country has a different approach to co-management. 
Thai Land 
In Thai Land, the Law, Fisheries Act, B.E.2490, had been enacted on the fundamental of 
freshwater fisheries which was the leading fishery. In ThaiLand, several of the fisheries laws can 
be employed as a legal basis for Community-based resource management (Pomeroy et al, 2003). 
In recent years,  any of the CBRM projects have been undertaken with supporting of NGOs in 
ThaiLand in general and in Southern ThaiLand in particular. Pomeroy et al, 2003 presented that 
all projects have focused on awareness creation among the community members about 
sustainable management; the building of local organizations and the capacity for conserving and 
rehabilitating the coastal resources and the encouragement of coordination among resource users, 
the government and NGOs (Tokrisna, Boonchuwongse and Janekarnkij, 1997). And it is 
recommended in ThaiLand that the sub-district administration Authority (Or-Bor-Tor) which 
included the sub-district head, village head, sub-district council, have been used like core unit of 
CBRM and Or-Bor-Tor could be in order to organize fishers and manage conflicts. Therefore, 
this activity will need to support to the ThaiLand institutions which will support to national 
government.  
Philippines 
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The Philippine has a long history of traditional fisheries rights and allocation (Kalagayan, 1991; 
Lopez, 1983). In 1991, the government decentralized the management of near-shore fisheries to 
municipalities and local fishing communities (Sen el at, 1996).  
But in 1998, the Republic Act No.8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code was signed into Law 
(Pomeroy et al). Carlos C. Baylon in the University of the Philippines conducted research to 
evaluate the Integrated Municipal Council (IMC) as an institution for co-management in the 
coastal zone. The IMC, which acts as an institution for co- management on a larger scale, is 
evaluated on the criteria of sustainability, efficiency and equity. A comparison of Banate Bay 
IMC and Batan Bay IMC was carried out based on levels of co-management undertaken 
(Pomeroy et al, 1997). The Council included representatives from local government, NGOs, 
groups of user, people's organizations, academics and policymakers. It is supported and advised 
by a number of advisory and administrative committees and task forces, which comprise 
representatives from different administrative levels (i.e. municipal, district, province). Recently, 
it is popular in Philippines to use the transaction costs to express a the successful co-management 
model, with the example of San Salvador Island. In this case study, transaction costs are used to 
analysis the co-management approach. The results of the San Salvador area for the period 1988–
1996 indicate that “the difference in the total costs of fisheries management between centralized 
government management and co management is not that significant. However, there is significant 
difference in the costs at the different stages of management. In stages one and two, which are 
the stages of initiating a new management regime and community education, the costs are higher 
for the co-management approach compared to the centralized government approach. The costs 
are however lower in the third stage for a co-managed approach when monitoring and 
enforcement and conflict resolution become important. These findings appear to be consistent 
with Hanna’s (1995) view that the downstream or implementation costs are likely to be lower for 
a co-managed approach” (Kuperan et al, 2008) 
2.5. Legal framework to implement co-management in Viet Nam 
In the report in IIFET in 2008, Lai said that although Vietnam has issued several legal documents 
related to co-management and democracy in general and especially for fisheries co-management, 
it is clear that those documents are not sufficiently facilitating fisheries co-management. 
However, up to now, the latest document in 2009 become the first legal framework for fisheries 
co-management in Viet Nam. The framework development in fisheries co-management in Viet 
Nam follows:  
In 1998, the Government issued Decree 29/1998-NĐ-CP on Democracy at the grass roots level, 
which supported democracy at grass-root level; it has created an environment to empower 
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ordinary citizens “People know, People discuss, People decide, People do and People supervise”. 
This document provided general conditions for people to participate in some certain levels of the 
local planning process and give comments on policy or projects/program implementation 
including fisheries-related projects. However, under the political and administrative system in 
Vietnam, those comments are not easy to be heard by the authorities or in other words, the decree 
did not really empower people to access to a real democracy as defined by western counties.  
In 2001 MOFI (now is into MARD) issued the Decision on formulation of Vietnam Fisheries 
Association (VINAFIS) with the network throughout the country. This organization is not a fully 
independent organization but acts as a lengthened hand of the government to govern fishers and 
fisheries. Theoretically, VINAFIS will act as a bridge or connection between government and the 
local fishing community and speak on behalf of its members. However, most of VINAFIS 
leaders are the present MOFI/MARD leaders or retired government fisheries officers, so there are 
no real fishers in the Chairman Committee of VINAFIS. Truly, the voice of fishers only are 
heard if the fishers go through the administrative system of government control such through the 
Vietnamese Fatherland Front (local and central level) system or People Council system (local 
and central level). However, this is complicated and take time to solve problems. 
In 2003, the new Fisheries Law, section 2, 3 of article 15 on management on capture fisheries 
indicated the central government would decentralize power to provincial government for the 
management of coastal fisheries and offshore fisheries. Under this legal document, the provincial 
government will be responsible for issuing the policy, and for regulation of rivers, lakes, 
reservoirs, lagoons and other natural waters belonging to their territory according to the guideline 
of the MOFI (MARD); provision of environment for fishers engaged in monitoring, and 
informing on illegal fishing practices. The central government will be responsible for zoning of 
provincial fishing territory  and lines: decentralizing ministries (MOFI, MARD, MONRE), 
sectors and provinces for ensuring the tied cooperation, comprehensive among Coast guard, 
marine police and fisheries investigators on fisheries MSC. 
In 2006, the Vietnamese government issued Decree 123/2006/NĐ-CP on decentralizing for the 
local level, which decentralized more power to the provincial government in management of 
inland and coastal fisheries. The decree also mentioned about the government facilitation for 
community based fisheries management in coastal water and decentralizing to local government 
on managing of coastal fisheries (registration, community based fisheries management models). 
However, after nearly two years enacted, no fishing rights were given to the local community due 
to lack of instruction from the central government and unclear arrangements under this 
document. The coastal zoning is also not finished, which as created difficulties for provincial 
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government to zones coastal area and provide fishing rights to communities. MARD is also 
confusing on how to zone the provincial water along 29 provinces along the coast. 
In 2006, under support of DANIDA/SCAFI, Working Group on Fisheries Co-management 
(FICO), Vietnam was setup up at national level based on MARD. The aim of the FICO is to 
coordinate and advise for fisheries co-management in Vietnam however, this is just bureaucratic 
unit with representatives from various sub-organizations under MARD, and many of those are 
un-knowledge of fisheries co-management and how to work together to coordinate fisheries co-
management at national level. 
In 2007, VIFEP collaborated with SCAFI on conducting a review on fisheries co-management in 
18 sites along Vietnam. It found that, among 18 sites on fisheries “co-management“ it was  very 
expensive to have permission form government on piloting the project and providing fishing 
rights to individuals or a community. Only some rare cases observed in Tam Giang lagoon (Thua 
Thien Hue), Tra O lagoon (Binh Dinh), Easoup reservoir and Lak lake (Dak Lak) found that the 
fishing rights were given to the local community through VNIAFIS. In most of other cases, 
fishers and project officers complained that, due to unavailable fishing rights provided, any kinds 
of or activities related to fisheries co-management, specially conservation and secured livelihood 
based on existing legal environment had failed already and would continue to fail if no change 
was enacted. 
Also in 2007, under support by SEAFDEC, a proposed national guideline on fisheries co-
management was developed. One of the important concepts in the national guideline is the 
fishing rights for local communities and establishment of local fisheries organization. However, 
it seems that MARD did not fully understood the concepts or did not express a strong interest in 
legalizing this document. MARD assigned the STOFA/DANIDA project to continue to support 
for re-formulating this national guideline and indicated that it might complete in the end of 2008. 
The approval of MARD for this guideline is crucial but possibility of official approval is not 
secured due to shortage of political will. 
Decree 57/2008/NĐ-CP of regulations on rights and obligations of the community  to protect and 
develop marine protected areas includes content of regulations on rights and obligations of the 
community in marine resource management. Article 4 of the decree showed that communities 
participate in MPA protecting and development. (1. The State encourages organizations, 
individuals, community participation in management activities, conservation and construction, 
development Marine Protected Area in accordance with the law. 2. Organizations, individuals 
and communities can participate: a) The communication, education and awareness improvement 
about protecting and conserving biodiversity; b) Observations, patrol and protect the marine 
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protected area; c) Scientific research and training in MPA; d) Services for ecotourism in the 
MPAs ...) 
Until 2008, there were not documents that clearly and effectively supported the co-management 
of fisheries in Viet Nam. The latest document is letter No.1700/BNN-KTBVNL, issued on June 
16, 2009, on the implementation of fisheries management in small  scale. The letter promotes 
activities implemented in the co-management model in small-scale fisheries in Viet Nam. 
Based on the above analyses, it can be said that the Vietnam government is willing to provide 
fishing right to the individual or fishing community and the government is decisive in ways of 
promoting fisheries co-management. It is legal framework to apply co-management approach in 
Viet Nam.  
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Chapter III  
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
This chapter will present the chosen area for study before applying the co-management model 
and after applying the co-management model. After that the methodology will be described 
(method to measure transaction costs in fisheries). The way to collect data to measure these 
transaction costs is the last part in this chapter. 
3.1. Study site 
3.1.1. General information 
Trao Reef is an area located in Van Hung Commune (Figure 10), a coastal sea of Van Phong 
Bay, with rich coral reefs. It is managed by Xuan Tu Community. It is nearly 55 km north of the 
tourist center of Nha Trang City, Khanh Hoa Province. The total land of Van Hung commune is 
4,842 ha and the population in 2010 is 10,841 people (2,556 households) including  5,497 males 
(50.7 % of population) and 5,344 females (49.3 % of population) (People’s Van Hung 
committee, 3/2010) .More than 70% of the community of Van Hung rely on fisheries and 
aquaculture as a primary or secondary source of income. However unsustainable practices have 
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Figure 10:  Site map and transect locations (Source: McDonald, 2005) 
 
The Van Hung community members established Trao Reef Marine Reserve in 2001, 3 km from 
shoreline and including the total areas of 89 ha covering the core zone area of 54 ha, and coral 
reef of 25 ha (Figure 10) (MCD,2009) with the support of the International Marine-life Alliance 
Vietnam (IMA) (now is MCD - Centre for Marinelife Conservation and Community 
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Development), to improve the fisheries resources, to prevent the reef from over-fishing, to 
prevent destruction1 natural resource in general and fisheries resource in particular, to allow the 
reed to rehabilitate.  
 
 
Figure 11:  Map of functional zones in Trao Reef Marine Reservation. 
(Adapted from NIO, 2004). 
 
Trao Reef area is quite small against Van Phong Bay, but the diversity of species and ecosystems 
are high in comparison with total of Van Phong Bay. The coral reef species and reef fish species 
numbered in this area are higher compared to other Reefs in Van Phong Bay. There are 69 reef 
fish species (69% of total number species in Van Phong Bay) and 59 coral reef species (64% of 
total species in Van Phong Bay) in Trao Reef (Hoang X.B., 2005). Coral reefs are also habitats of 
many kinds of fish for feeding and breeding activities.  Now, all fishing activities are banned in 
Trao Reef Marine Reserve. Community members are hoping to increase depleted commercial 
fish stocks, and allow one of the most diverse coral reef environments in the region to recover.  
3.1.2. Trao Reef before applying co-management 
During the period when the project had not yet been operated, the local natural resources were 
over-exploited because of the open access status of fishing by local people. 
• Coral reef: in the previous years, the illegal and uncontrolled activities of harvesting coral 
in the Ran Trao waters appeared extreme so that the coral reef areas as well as the fisheries 
resources were reduced seriously together with the great damage to the natural environment and 
Strictly reserved area:  
- Forbid strictly all fishing and 
aquaculture activities.  
- Ban all of anchorage activities 
- Minimizing impacted activities 
to environment.  
- All other activities have to be 
allowed by government.  
 
Resource reserved area and 
tourism development.  
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habitats for all local species and the loss of the ecosystem balance. The exploitation of the coral 
reef in order to make ponds to aquaculture tiger shrimp is also leading to marine resource 
depletion. Combined with the diminishing of coral resources, many negative impacts in the 
culture of Tiger shrimp and the cage culture of the lobster can be seen clearly. For instance, the 
reduction or even the disappearance of the lobster juveniles in nature, low growth of the lobster 
and shrimp, weak immunization against disease, or sometimes mass amount of death due to the 
pollution of water resources. Obviously, the more the coral reef was destroyed, the more 
challenges the aquaculture was faced with. By this way, the aquaculture would disappear little by 
little. 
• Coral fish: Coral fish’s habitat depended completely on the coral reef. The appearance of 
coral fish was regarded with the great value because of the variety of color and the coral fish 
family diversity. According to Vo Si Tuan (1996), when the coral reef was depleted, the cover of 
coral was reduced, the substrate was covered by dead corals and organic residues, and the 
landscape that was one of the important components of community was be changed. Most of the 
commercial fish (grouper, snapper, sweetlips …) described by local residents in the past 
seemingly disappeared or rarely appeared in transect (NIO, 2001). As some local fishermen 
mentioned, 50% of the amount of high value fish with the great size reduced in the waters around 
Van Hung commune in compared with the past (NIO,2001). In addition, according to Ho (Đao 
Tan Ho, 1991), on the coral reef in Van Phong Bay, there are 630 species; however, a survey by 
Reef check method based on some high value species showed that they are seemingly 
disappeared in surveyed transects except for 4 species that appeared in Trao reef (NIO, 2001). 
• The fishing status: the results of the assessment for Van Hung commune in 2000 showed 
that the yield of the fishery harvest had been diminished continuously for 10 years. In 1996, the 
total amount of harvest was at 250 tons; however, the amount only reached a peak of 100 tones in 
1999 (reported by People’s Van Hung committee, 2001). The number as well as the size of the 
fisheries productions also reduced  along with the extinction of some precious species. By 2000, 
in former Xuan Tu village, there were 468 fishing households, 45 of which worked as 
professional divers and 10 owned the trawlers to fish the main target species of lobster juveniles 
(MCD, 2001). This was the dangerous career, as the fishermen is used to the primitive tools 
without basing their efforts on any scientific methods to catch fish. The use of the tools such as 
dynamite, Xianua, or trawler is leading to the harvest of the smaller sized fish; and the harvest is 
diminsihing and it has forced some species to extinction (milkfish juveniles, ray fish and sea 
star). 
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Aquaculture: in 2000, 587 local households, who cultured over 1000 lobster cages, lived in the 
former Xuan Tu village (MCD, 2001). The development of these lobster cages was not controlled 
or planned. In addition, the high density of cultivation caused the low quality of water and the 
stream of water. The disposal from the industrial culture ponds of Tiger Shrimp as well as the 
throw of rubbish into the sea created the pollution of seawater. The uncontrolled harvest of coral 
reef impacted seriously the natural resource of lobster juveniles. There was no specific plan for 
aquaculture areas, and the lack of cultivated technical information lead to the low growth and the 
serious epidemics in the aquaculture of shrimp. 
3.1.3. Trao Reef after applying co-management 
Now, Trao reef marine reserve has maintained good status and the protection activities 
have been carried out 24 hours per day. The improvement of local people’s perception for 
preservation of marine resource can be seen clearly. Extinction and depletion fishing method do 
not exist now. Besides, the uncontrolled harvest of coral was reduced and there was the willing 
participation from local authorities to be against and to forbid such illegal activities. 
 
Figure 12: % Cover of each substrate type at Trao Reef North 2001-2009 
(Source: Reefcheck, 2009) 
• Coral reef: Hard coral cover has steadily decreased in Trao Reef North over the survey 
from 2001 to 2009, with 2009 results showing a 6% reduction in hard coral from 2001 (Fig 12). 
In contrast to Trao Reef North, Trao Reef West has presented an 18.3% increase in hard Coral 
cover since surveys were initially conducted in 2004 (Fig 13). Reefcheck (2009) also presented 
that hard coral is an exceptionally slow growing species, growing at average rates of 0.5-
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2cm/year (McCook, 1999). There is difference of results from 2005 and 2009, because of 
variations in transect locations in surveys in each year (Reefcheck, 2009). The reduction may be 
due to increased bleaching events or coral disease because of natural oceanographic processes. 
Soft coral cover coverage has steadily increased at Trao Reef North, with 7.3% more coverage in 
2009 compared with 2001 results (Fig 12). Soft coral are faster growing coral and compete with 
hard coral for space.  
 
Figure 13:  % Cover of each substrate type at Trao Reef  West 2001-2009 
(Source: Reefcheck, 2009) 
 
• Coral fish: the individual density of coral fish in Trao Reef was of 1.500 individual/400 
m²  in 2005 in comparison to 318 individual/400 m2 in 3/2001 (Mcdonald, 2005). In most of the 
monitoring areas, there was the significant increase in the average individual density of coral 
fish; especially, in the northern and Western in Trao Reef for the group of small size fish (1-
10cm). However in the group of larger size fish (>20cm) this change was not remarkable. The 
increase occurred mainly in the family of snapper, Chaetodon lunula , Pomacentridae. 
Meanwhile, Chaetodon lunula was considered as the indicator species due to the sensitivity of 
this fish with the degradation of coral reef. Based on the increasing individual density of 
Chaetodon lunula ( from 15 in 2001 to 23 individual/400m² in 2003) (NIO,2004), it can be said 
that the operation to protect the coral reef in Trao Reef was efficient. 
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Figure 14:  Total fish densities (400m2) observed across sites from 2001-2009 
(Source: Reefcheck, 2009) 
 
• The annual yield of fish increased by year; but, it is obvious that this change was not 
completely caused by the establishment of Trao Reef. There are some possible reasons for this, 
including that local fishermen went fishing in pelagic waters in Van Phong Bay and only a third 
of local households fished in the planned areas around Trao Reef (People’s Van Hung 
committee, 2009). However, in answering the questionnaires, nearly all local households 
supposed that the yield was increasing in as a result of the reduction of extermination methods of 
fishing (see more details in Result chapter). The supports from Trao Reef marine reserve project 
in term of technology provided the countable increase in the fishing yield and the limitation of 
impacts by disease. In addition, along with the success of the trial model to culture sweet snail, 
the income of local residents was remarkably accelerated (Reefcheck, 2009) 
 
3.2. Methodology 
In order to analyze the transaction costs of fisheries co-management system, the research has to 
mention about the development process from existing management regime to the co-
management. The activities involved in the development process of co-management (Fig 14) 
included: recognition for the need of a new management regime, discussion and meetings, 
information collection, organizing and leadership, defining the management objectives and 
strategies and developing institutional arrangements; all of which is considered as the first stage 
for developing a co-management institution. The second or the implementation stage involved 
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community education, training for the development of technical skills and management capacity 
of the fishers and developing institutional arrangements. The third stage include monitoring and 
enforcement, maintaining institutional arrangements, adjudicating conflicts, sanctioning violators 
and adjusting  institutional rules were considered as the third stage (. The sum of the costs of 
each of these activities was the total transaction costs of initiating, implementing and maintaining 
the co-management system (Abdullah et al, 1998).  
The development process of co-management has 3 stages while the process of developing the 
centralized management system is divided basically into two stages, including: 1) establishing 
the institution, collecting information, implementing the decisions through dissemination of 
information, training of government officers to be acquainted with the management expertise and 
technical knowledge of fish culture; and 2) maintaining, monitoring and ensuring compliance 
with institutional rules and adjusting rules as conditions in fishery change (Kuperan et al, 1999). 
The centralized management system  is not focused on community development and is only 
concerned with revenue earnings, thus takes less time to implement policies than in a co-




Co-management in Trao reef Marine Reserve, Vietnam – A transaction costs approach 
 





Figure 15:  Process of Moving towards Co-management 
(Source: Kuperan et al. 1999 – modified from White et al, 1994) 
 
3.3. Data collection 
The data were collected in the some days at the end of March, 2010. The method is used to 
collect that data is randomly sampled. There are 2 kinds of data to serve for this research as 
following:   
• Secondary data, 
• Primary data. 
3.3.1.  Secondary data  
In order to identify and measure transaction costs and identify the obstacle to applying measuring 
transaction costs, the secondary data is collected from MCD Viet Nam, DICAFIREP. The 
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general socio-economics data were gathered from District People’s committee, Fisheries Section 
and MCD.  
3.3.2. Primary data 
To obtain information to evaluate management efficiency in socioeconomic issues and identify 
the opportunities and obstacles to apply transaction costs in Trao Reef, the socioeconomic survey 
was conducted in two villages in Van Hung commune named Xuan Tu No.1 and Xuan Tu No.2 
both of which are affected directly by the sustainable development in Trao Reef  
The sample size is 60 households in the both villages. This survey focuses on questions related to 
with the perceptions of the local community about Trao Reef as co-management model, 
awareness about environment protection: related activities in Trao Reef, … All information 
needed for solving research problem is showed in full questionnaire in Appendix 5 
 
Xuan Tu village (2010) (Source: Nguyen Hai Anh, 2010) 
3.3.3. Data analysis 
To show the results of  management efficiencies, the opportunities and obstacles in applying the 
transaction costs in Co-management in Trao Reef, the questionnaires are collected from 3 
interviewers, and filtered wrong questionnaires (because of conflicts in answering questionnaire 
or other reasons – this will be presented more clearly in the next chapter). After that the Excel 
software is used to present all data in the questionnaire, after that using the  filter, count, sum, 
average, … functions in excel software to have appropriate results.  
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To have the result related measuring transaction costs, the collected data from MCD are also 
presented in Excel software and next step is identification what are transaction costs, and 
measure total transaction costs by sum function in Excel software.  
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Chapter IV  
RESULTS 
 
This chapter will show about results after research about case study in Trao Reef, Van Hung 
commune, Van Ninh district, Khanh Hoa Province, Viet Nam. It include the part of overview 
about general information, socioeconomic issues, the management status in Trao reef, and after 
that identify and measure transaction costs as well as point out the obstacles in applying 
transaction costs in Viet Nam. 
According the data collection in the chapter III – Methodology and data collection, the data were 
collected from 60 informants, but when check and input the data from questionnaire into excel 
software, 6 questionnaires have unsuitable information. Therefore, this analysis only based on 54 
questionnaires, and the results from them as following: 
4.1. General information 
Because the sample is random, the survey is implemented along the coastal of Xuan Tu Sea. 
Therefore, the result is that 21 questionnaire is answered by in Xuan Tu 1 community, and 33 in 
Xuan Tu 2 community (Appendix 1). And it is about 24.07 % (13/54) of fishermen are female 
and 70.37 % are male and the rest of 5.56% is undefined gender because the interviewers forgot 








Figure 16:  Gender distribution 
In this survey also showed that the header of family in the study site is often a man who makes 
main income for the whole family, the women usually stay at home as a housewife, most of them 
have not got jobs, and feel shy when they were asked. It explains why most of informants are 
male.  
In 54 interviewed household, there were 45 households (about 83%) involved in fisheries 
activities and 64 – 70 % of their living depend on fisheries (Appendix 1)  
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4.2. The hierarchy of co-management system 
Asking about the management regime, 100% of the informants affirmed that they were free in 
Xuan Tu Sea for fisheries activities before applying the co-management in managing Trao reef 
area (Appendix 2). After applying the co-management system the hierarchy in Trao Reef marine 
reserve following the Figure 17 , and all of fishing activities is banned in this area, and Trao Reef 
is protected directly by core group, ecosystem tourism group, propaganda group …and all 
members in this communities. 
 
Figure 17:  Hierarchy of co-management arrangement in Trao Reef 
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4.3. Knowledge of communities about co-management in Trao Reef Marine Reserve 
In order to measure the knowledge of the Trao Reef communities, the questionnaire focuses on 
the issues related to the knowledge of marine reserve such as management, core group, the 
necessary of the Trao reef model, decision-making in Trao Reef management, … 38 of 54 
(70.37%) interviewees affirmed that the establishment of the marine reserve come from all 
stakeholders’ requirement, 5 of 54 (9.26%) did not know about this information, and the rest 
thought that establish Trao Reef Marine reserve come from requirement of NGO, or Gov-NGO, 
… as following: 
Table 6: Establishing Trao Reef Marine reserve accordance with stakeholders 
expectations and requirements  
Establish Trao Reef depend on 
Requirement of 
Number Percentage 





(Source: My own survey) 
Although, only 70.37% interviewees understood that the establishment of Trao Reef came from 
all stakeholders’ requirements, but 92.59% (50/54) informants said that it is necessary to 
establish Trao Reef for reservation and sustainable development goals of nature resource in 
general and fisheries in particular, but still have 7,41% think that it is not necessary. 70.37% of 
54 informants knew about the core group’s operation, and 62.96% of them agreed that the core 
group operated effective. The Table 7 bellow will show more detail about informant’s view about 
core group’s role:  
Table 7:  Information related core group and their operation: 
Number Percentage 
Items 
Yes Unknown No 
Total
Yes Unknown No 
Total 
Informant said that there 
are core 
group/associations in this 
area 38 16 0 54 70.37% 29.63% 0.00% 100.00%
The core group has 
effective operations 34 16 4 54 62.96% 29.63% 7.41% 100.00%
(Source: My own survey). 
4.4. The communities participation and their perception 
4.4.1. Communities participation 
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Although the communities were educated, participated workshop, training … to know about Trao 
Reef model as well as co-management, but only under 50% (44.44%) informants said that 

















Figure 18:  Who makes decision in management Trao Reef Marine Reserve 
 
There are 45/54 interviewees said that they participated in initial establishment process, the high 
percentage of communities participation in the different activities of Trao Reef show that 
intensive community involvement in management process and 9/54 interviewees said that they 
did not participate any activities in the initial process of  Trao Reef establishment, but most of 
them lived in Van Hung commune under 10 year (6/9) – after the Trao Reef started.  
 
Table 8:  The years living in Van Hung commune of the informants who did not 
participate in initial process of Trao Reef establishment 
Informant 
Years living in Van 
Hung commune 
Did you participate in initial process 
of Trao Reef establishment 
3 8 No 
6 7 No 
9 8 No 
17 No information  No 
22 10 No 
25 35 No 
29  No information No 
33 5 No 
50 10 No 
(Source: My own survey) 
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4.4.2. Communities perception about changing in Trao Reef Marine Reserve 
Through education, propaganda, workshop, … the awareness of the local people about 
environment, knowledge of policies and law improved a lot. Example they changed their habit, 
for instance, instead of throwing household garbage into the sea, the villagers fixed them in the 
ground or paid for rubbish collecting service. 81% of interviewees affirmed that the awareness 
about environment increased and is about 76% affirmed that the environment is better and the 
violation cases - 69% of 54 informants said that the violation cases decreased. The communities 
awareness and knowledge is higher is leading to the management in Trao Reef is effective. Table 
9 shows the results of the survey about the Trao Reef marine reserve according to 54 interviewed 
villagers as following: 
 
Table 9:  Perception of informants about changes in Trao Reef 
(the detail information in the Appendix  … ) 
Increase Stable Unknown Decrease Total 
Items 
No % No % No % No % No % 
Awareness about 
Environment 44 81% 10 19% 0 0% 0 0% 54 100%
Knowledge of policies and 
laws 43 80% 11 20% 0 0% 0 0% 54 100%
Violation cases 5 9% 11 20% 1 2% 37 69% 54 100%
Number of fishes 37 69% 12 22% 3 6% 2 4% 54 100%
Number of high value 
fishes 33 61% 15 28% 4 7% 2 4% 54 100%
Size of fish 29 54% 13 24% 4 7% 8 15% 54 100%
Jobs 25 46% 26 48% 0 0% 3 6% 54 100%
Living standard 36 67% 17 31% 0 0% 1 2% 54 100%
Environment 41 76% 9 17% 0 0% 4 7% 54 100%
(Source: My own survey) 
Environment conservation was improved leading to resources conservation and resources 
rehabilitation, job opportunities and living standard was enhanced, it is presented clearly in Table 
9 that it is about 94% of informants said that the job opportunities is increased or stable, only 6% 
said that it is decreased. The fisheries resource was getting better, that 69% of interviewees were 
happy to say that the number of fish increased and 61% answered that number of high value 
fishes increased, and more than 50% of 54 informants said that the size of fish in the Trao Reef is 
bigger.  
4.5. Communities conflicts 
Under the co-management regime, the conflicts between the people in the same community and 
between people inside and outside of community and also between the people doing in fisheries 
with the people not doing in fisheries were solved. The data from the survey is as an evidence 
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that 37 of 54 (68.51%) informants said that the conflict between people in the Trao Reef 
communities is decreased, the conflicts between the people inside and outside of community and 
the conflicts between the people doing in fisheries and people not doing in fisheries were 
decreased or kept stable in the same percentage at 87%. (47/54). 
4.6. Measure transaction costs 
According the presentation in the chapter III about the methodology and data collection, it 
showed that the method to measure transaction costs is that first of all, we have to identify 3 
stages in process movement from current management regime to co-management regime. The 
Figure 19 presented this process in Trao Reef:  
 
Figure 19:  Process of Moving towards Co-management 
(Source: MCD, 2009). 
The secondly is identification of all transaction costs. According the data, which is provided by 
the MCD, we have the table below:  
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Table 10:  Transaction costs in implementation of co-management in Trao Reef from 
2001 to 2009 (Millions) 
Activities 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Zoning 5.00 - - - - - - - -
Environment 
investigation 82.50  82.50 7.00 - - - - -
PRA 20.00 - - - - - - - -
Improvement of 
communities 
awareness 27.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 22.00 78.00 45.00 48.00 6.65 
Infrastructure and 
equipment  55.70 - 25.00 - - - - - -
Research of Resource 
Rehabilitation   - 22.00 - - - - - 190.00 5.50 
Another assessment 
research - - - - 115.50 - - 44.55 -
Marine reserve 
Establishment 24.75 - - - - - - - -
Regulation Building - 109.50 - - - - - - -
Livelihood  - - - - 58.00 50.00 45.00 67.00 30.01 
Communication and 
broadcast  3.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.80 3.50 3.50 3.50 4.00 
Labors 240.00 240.00 360.00 360.00 360.00 360.00 360.00 240.00 10.00 
Movement 35.20 17.60 56.40 56.40 56.40 56.40 56.40 56.40 -
Build management 
Plan - 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 15.65 95.00 
Management and 
operation in the 
local 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 40.00 40.60 45.00 49.44 34.00 
Total 503.65 420.25 556.05 455.55 670.35 604.15 570.55 714.54 151.16 
(Source: MCD, 2009) 
According the above mention, the process to moving towards to co-management have 3 stages: 
1) from 2001 to 2002; 2) from 2003 to 2008 and the last was 2009. The average of transaction 
cost for each year in 3 stages are:  
Table 11:  Average of transaction costs for each stage: 
Content 
Stage 1 
(2001 – 2002) 
Stage 2 
(2003 – 2008) 
Stage 3 
(2009) 
Total costs 923.90 3571.19 151.16
Average cost/year 461.95 595.19 151.16
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Chapter V  
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1. Discussion 
According the report of IMA (2004) about evaluation of co-management model in Trao reef 
marine reservation, the long term purposes of the establishment of Trao reef  were to protect and 
manage the reef ecosystem in a sustainable way. Moreover, the co-management model should 
contribute both to keep the reef in a good conditions and support sustainable capture and 
aquaculture activities that could improve the socioeconomic status and the living standards in the 
local communities in Van Hung commune. Based on these purposes the required outcomes from 
this project were:  
• Protection and rehabilitation of the coral reef and reef fish in Trao Reef (Outcome related 
to “Fisheries Resource”) 
• Improvement of local communities awareness of environment protection. (Outcome 
related to “Local communities awareness”) 
• Improve peoples’ access to credit sources. Enhancement of livelihood and technical 
improvement in fisheries and aquaculture to increase the productivity and decrease negative 
impacts with the environment and sea waters. (Outcome related “Household income”) 
• Improve the management abilities of fisheries resource for local communities and 
fisheries staffs in coastal areas (Outcome related “management abilities”) 
In general, as below description, several of the expected outcomes where reached: 
5.1.1. Fisheries Resource 
The reports of NIO (2001, 2003, 2005), reef check (2010) and an original survey for the purpose 
of this research (3.2010) indicate that the amount of fish (included reef fish), high value fish, and 
fish size has increased in the Trao Reef area . Thus, there is a correspondence between the reports 
and the results in this paper. As the description in Chapter IV, 69% of interviewees reported that 
they had experienced that the number of fish had increased. Sixty-one percents answered that 
number of high value fishes increased, and more than 50% of 54 informants said that the size of 
fish in the Trao Reef has increased (Table 9). Both the reports and this study’s results point 
forwards positive ecological outcomes of the Trao Reef marine reserve. Furthermore, when the 
people in the communities in the area anticipate/expect  higher benefits in the future from the 
marine reserve, the establishment of the reserve seems to have improved and increased the 
peoples opinion about marine conservation. 
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5.1.2. Local communities awareness 
Local communities awareness about Trao Reef Marine reserve:  
The survey results indicated that 70.37% of interviewees affirmed that the establishment of the 
marine reserve came from all stakeholders’ requirement (Table 6) . Consequently, these results 
can be interpreted as an increase in the local communities awareness of the need for marine 
protection. This awareness can be seen as an effect of all the activities related to the 
establishment process of the  Trao Reef marine reserve. Furthermore, the results show that the 
stakeholders compliance with the regulations of marine reserve is very high. This is evidenced by 
the fact that 92.59% (50/54) informants see it as necessary to establish Trao Reef to fulfill the  
sustainable development goals of nature resource protection in general and fisheries in particular 
in this area. Additionally, 70.37% of 54 informants knew about the core group’s operation, and 
62.96% of them agreed that the core group operated effectively. (Table 7). This means that they 
had knowledge and concern about the Trao Reef, kept track of all activities of Trao reef, and that 
their awareness about co-management model is increasing over time.  
Participation: 
45 of 54 interviewees reported that had participated in the initial establishment process. A high 
percentage of communities participate in the different activities of Trao Reef as 100% 
respondents said they have participated in the clean up the beach events, and they are willing to 
contribute to maintain the Marine reserve by their own effort when the supporter (NGOs) stops 
support for this area. It shows that communities have been involved intensively in the 
management process.  
5.1.3. Household income 
The principal source of cash income for the majority of households as revealed in this study is 
from the fishery (according the Reef Check, 2009). In the MCD’s report, more than 70% of the 
community of the inhabitants in communities of Van Hung relies on fisheries and aquaculture as 
the primary or secondary source of income, and from the current survey, this proportion is from 
60 to 70%. Other significant economic activities are agriculture and small business, which 
together contributed only about 30% in total household income. This indicates that the income 
from fisheries is very important in role with this area. Therefore, it is vitally important build an 
appropriate management regime to protect the fisheries and the incomes they provide.  
5.1.4. Management abilities 
Under the co-management regime, the conflicts between all stakeholders in the same or different 
communities were solved. Their compliance, the awareness of regulation, and the willing 
participation increased and 100% of stakeholders said that they will contribute money for the 
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funds or their strength which are used for Trao Reef management. These are evidences for 
management efficiencies in Trao Reeef Marine reserve. 
5.1.5. Measurement transaction costs in Trao Reef 
The expected results with regards to measurement transaction costs are often that “the difference 
in the total costs of fisheries management between centralized government management and co 
management is not significant” (Kuperan, et al, 2008). However, Kuperan, et al (2008) affirmed 
“there is significant difference in the costs at the different stages of management. In stages one 
and two, which are the stages of initiating a new management regime and community education, 
the costs are higher for the co-management approach compared to the centralized government 
approach. The costs are however lower in the third stage for a co-managed approach when 
monitoring and enforcement and conflict resolution become important” (Kuperan, et al, 2008). 
However, in this thesis it is not possible to do a direct comparision of the total transaction costs 
between a centralized and a co-management system because no system existed here before the 
Trao Reef project. Therefore a more indirect approach was applied. In the survey, direct 
interview was implemented with local communities (Commune level), Mr Dao Van Luong – 
Chief of District Agriculture and Rural Development Division  (District level), Mr Dau – Deputy of 
Department of Fisheries resources protection (Province level). Also utilized was indirect 
interview by sending email to Dr. Chu Tien Vinh – Director of Directorate of capture fisheries 
and fisheries resource protection, now is Deputy Director of General Directorate of Fisheries 
(Government level) about management regime for fisheries in Trao Reef before Trao Reef 
Marine Reserve establishment. 100% interviewees confirmed that there were not any 
management activities and regime in Trao Reef before the co-management model was 
implemented. Trao Reef was an open access area and no information of management costs in the 
centralization regime existed . The current research tried to reveal the transaction costs in 
centralization regime by some different indirect ways like calculation of the total transaction 
costs in centralization regime based on  budgets of Van Hung commune, or management costs of 
Van Phong Bay because Trao Reef is located in Van Hung commune and belong to Van Phong 
Bay. However, a problem was that the budget for Van Hung commune did not have allocations 
for fisheries management, and Van Phong Bay was established after Trao Reef Marine Reserve. 
Because of limited time of current survey, therefore, there was not a solution presented here for 
this problem.  
Although, the study still pointed out some achievements. Firstly, the transaction costs for the 
stage 3 is less than the costs for stage 1 and 2. It is consistent with the literature in above analysis. 
This is because of the lower cost of monitoring and enforcement because local communities 
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complies easier with rules and regulations that are developed by themselves and not by an 
external regulatory authority. Second, from the case studies which were mentioned in literature 
framework part in this thesis and from a lot of research of co-management were presented in the 
book “Fisheries co-management,  the role of local institutions and decentralization in Southeast 
Asia” highlighted some aspects and instruments which are important in co-management. These 
aspects and instrusments are property rights, participation, local knowledge, conflict resolution, 
compliance and enforcement, and traction costs. The author said that “the reduction of 
transaction costs is one of main arguments for adopting co-management”. Third, the current 
survey also showed that 100% interviewees answered that they prefer to answer the question in 
questionnaire related to only cost than both costs and benefits.  
 
5.2. Recommendation 
This research is based on the literature related with MPAs, Co-management and transaction costs and 
from my own survey in Trao Reef marine reserve, Van Hung, Van Ninh, Khanh Hoa. The study 
presented about the success of co-management in the sharing of power and responsibility between 
all stakeholders in using and managing fisheries resources in general and in transaction costs 
approach in particular as well as revealed some obstacles in applying transaction costs in co-
management system in the case study in Viet Nam, recommendations are as bellow:    
- The universities in Viet Nam and other international programs in Viet Nam (specially, master and 
PhD programs) should be supported to encourage students to research about co-management in 
particular and management regimes in general as well as the transaction costs approach. All these 
studies will contribute to prove to the government that co-management is maybe a good management 
solution for fisheries resources in particular and natural resources in general for the future.  
- The co-management regime is maybe a good solution for future fisheries management in Viet Nam, 
therefore the government should be focused on this issue like supporting the legal framework of 
government policies with an update of the fisheries law. The ministry of agriculture and rural 
development (government level) should have a national guideline1 of co-management to guide and 
apply for all co-management models in Viet Nam. The provinces (local level) should create good 
conditions for applying co-management models at the local level, and attract NGOs and other 
stakeholders (private sector, civil society, universities and others) to support this model application.  
- For the research to be successful, access to quality data is an important thing. Therefore, the 
government should prioritize information management systems. 
                                                 
1 The National Fisheries Co-Management Guidelines (drafting assisted by Danish International Development 
Assistance - Danida) have been submitted to MARD for approval and the document is currently being revised by the 
Legal Department.  
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- The last recommendation is that there should be a holistic approach, a synchronization and 
comprehensive exchange mechanism in co-management application from the government level to 
local level in Viet Nam.  
 
5.3. Further study 
- This study presents some of the obstacles related to transaction costs in co-management in a 
case study in Vietnam, however, it also revealed the important roles in applying transaction costs 
in co-management, and some certain achievements thus, for the further studies should focus on 
studying more about this issue. 
-Based on the previous studies and this study showed that MPAs and co-management is 
important solutions for fisheries resource management in Viet Nam in the future. While an 
obstacle in applying in co-management is lack of information about the costs in a centralized 
system. Therefore, further study should focus on researching about the application of co-
management in MPAs, transaction costs approach in Viet Nam to prove the success of co-
management model and can avoid lacking of cost information.  
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Trao reef marine reserve is the first marine reserve applying co-management in Vietnam. In 
addition, this study is the first paper study about the transaction costs approach in fisheries co-
management in Vietnam. Therefore, the study had a lot of difficulties and obstacles in the 
development process, like lack of information and national documents related to transaction costs 
in fisheries co-management in Vietnam. Although, with the best endeavor in studying and the 
valuable support from all of supervisors and supporters, the study has some achievements:  
- Overview about literature of MPAs, fisheries co-management, fisheries co-management in 
MPA and transaction costs as well as the methodology to measure transaction costs in co-
management. For instance, fisheries co-management is understood as the sharing of 
responsibility and authority in using and managing fisheries resources, and transaction costs are 
the total costs of information collection, collective fisheries decision-making and collective 
operation in fisheries management, and it may either increase or decrease in total costs, but the 
study showed that the cost for the stage 3 will reduce compare with stages 1 and 2. It means that 
the transaction costs in co-management will reduce in the future.  
- Effectiveness evaluation of Trao Reef marine reserve based on co-management regime like 
improvement of fisheries’ awareness, rehabilitation of fisheries resource, solve conflicts between 
stakeholders in using and managing fisheries resource, … and transaction costs approach, is 
possible a good approach for evaluate fisheries co-management in Trao reef. The study also 
pointed out that co-management is solution for managing the Trao reef Marine Reserve. 
The study based on the secondary data and primary data as well as the MPAs, co-management 
literature framework and methodology of measurement transaction costs in fisheries co-
management.  
The study is in a case study in Van Hung commune, Van Ninh district, Khanh Hoa province, Viet 
Nam and the survey took place in Xuan Tu 1, 2 villages in Van Hung commune with 60 
informants, included 54/60 the interview papers are valid, and 6/60 are invalid 
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% income depend on 
fisheries 
1 M 1 40 1 100 
2 M 1 35 1 100 
3 F 1 8 1 100 
4 M 2 40 1 100 
5 M 2 35 0 0 
6 F 2 7 1 100 
7 M 1 35 1 100 
8 M 1 45 1 100 
9 F 1 8 1 50 
10 M 1 58 1 50-75 
13 F 1 30 1 100 
15 M 1 30 1 100 
16 M 1 20 1 50-75 
17 M 1  0 0 
18 M 1 30 1 75-100 
19 M 2 80 1 100 
20  2 56 1 25 
21 M 2 35 1 100 
22 M 2 10 1 75-100 
24 M 2 30 0 0 
25 M 2 35 1 25 
26 F 2 49 0 0 
27 M 2 31 1 100 
28 M 2 50 1 100 
29 M 2  1 100 
30 F 2 50 1 25 
31 M 2 40 1 100 
32 M 2 70 1 50 
33 M 2 5 1 100 
34 M 2 50 1 75-100 
35 M 2 35 1 50-75 
36  1 40 1 75-100 
37 M 1 40 1 50-75 
38 M 2 13 1 100 
39 M 2 35 1 50 
40  2 50 1 25-50 
41 F 1  1 25-50 
42 F 2 12 0 0 
43 M 1 15 0 0 
44 M 1 60 1 50 
45 M 1 32 0 0 
46 M 2 43 1 75 
47 F 2 49 1 50 
48 F 2 29 1 100 
49 F 2 30 1 75-100 
50 M 2 10 0 0 




52 M 2 32 1 100 
53 F 1 44 1 100 
55 M 1 67 1 100 
56 M 1 53 1 75-100 
58 M 2 45 0 0 
59 F 2 47 1 50 


























Were there core 
group/associations 




























1 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
2 No All Yes Yes Yes Gov-NGO Gov Yes Yes 
3 No Unknown Yes Yes Yes All Gov No No 
4 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
5 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
6 No Unknown Yes Yes Yes Com-NGO Gov No No 
7 No All No Yes No Unknown Gov Yes No 
8 No All Yes Yes Yes Unknown Unknown Yes No 
9 No Unknown Yes Yes Yes Unknown Unknown No No 
10 No All Yes Unknown Unknown Com-NGO Gov Yes No 
13 No All Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Yes No 
15 No Gov-NGO No Unknown No Unknown Unknown Yes No 
16 No All No Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Yes No 
17 No Unknown No Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown No No 
18 No All Yes Unknown Unknown Gov-Com Gov Yes Yes 
19 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
20 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
21 No All Yes Yes Yes Gov-Com Gov Yes No 
22 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov No No 
24 No All Yes Yes Yes Com   Gov Yes Yes 
25 No NGO Yes Yes Yes Unknown Gov No No 
26 No All Yes Yes Yes Unknown Gov Yes Yes 
27 No All Yes Yes Yes All Unknown Yes No 
28 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
29 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov No Yes 
30 No Gov-NGO Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
31 No All Yes Unknown Unknown Gov-Com All Yes No 
32 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes No 
33 No Unknown Yes Unknown Unknown All Gov No No 
34 No All Yes Yes Yes NGO Gov Yes Yes 
35 No All Yes Unknown Unknown Com Unknown Yes No 
36 No All Yes Unknown No Gov-com Gov Yes No 
37 No All Yes Yes No All Gov Yes Yes 
38 No All Yes Unknown Unknown Gov-Com Gov Yes No 
39 No Gov-NGO Yes Unknown Unknown Gov-Com Gov Yes No 
40 No All Yes Yes Yes Com Gov Yes Yes 




42 No NGO Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
43 No NGO Yes Unknown Unknown All Gov Yes No 
44 No Gov-NGO Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
45 No All Yes Unknown Unknown NGO Gov Yes No 
46 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes No 
47 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes No 
48 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
49 No Gov-NGO Yes Unknown Unknown NGO Gov Yes No 
50 No NGO Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown Gov No No 
51 No NGO Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes No 
52 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
53 No NGO Yes Yes Unknown Unknown Gov Yes No 
55 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
56 No All Yes Yes Yes Unknown Unknown Yes No 
58 No All Yes Yes Yes All Gov Yes Yes 
59 No All Yes Yes Yes Gov-Com Gov Yes No 











































1 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
2 Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta Sta Decr Incr Incr Incr 
3 Incr Sta Sta Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr 
4 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
5 Incr Sta Sta Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
6 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta Decr Incr Incr Incr 
7 Sta Sta Sta Incr Sta Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta 
8 Sta Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Sta 
9 Incr Incr Sta Decr Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Incr 
10 Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Incr 
13 Decr Decr Sta Decr Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta 
15 Decr Decr Decr Decr Incr Decr Decr Sta Sta Sta 
16 Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta 
17 Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta 
18 Incr Incr Incr Sta Sta Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
19 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
20 Incr Incr Incr Sta Incr Incr Sta Incr Sta Incr 
21 Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
22 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta Incr Incr Incr 
24 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
25 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Sta Incr Incr 
26 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
27 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
28 Incr Incr Sta Incr Sta Incr Decr Sta Incr Incr 
29 Sta Incr Incr Sta Sta Sta Decr Incr Sta Incr 
30 Sta Sta Sta Sta Decr Sta Decr Incr Sta Incr 
31 Decr Sta Decr Decr Incr Sta Decr Incr Incr Sta 
32 Incr Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Decr Incr Sta Incr 
33 Incr Sta Sta Decr Sta Sta Decr Incr Incr Incr 
34 Incr Incr Sta Incr Incr Incr Sta Incr Incr Incr 
35 Incr Incr Incr Decr Sta Incr Sta Sta Sta Incr 
36 Sta Incr Incr Sta Sta Incr Sta Incr Incr Sta 
37 Sta Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr 
38 Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta Sta 
39 Decr Incr Incr Decr Decr Sta Decr Incr Sta Sta 
40 Incr Incr Incr Decr Sta Sta Decr Sta Incr Incr 
41 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Sta Incr 
42 Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
43 Incr Sta Sta Sta Sta Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
44 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
45 Incr Unkown Unknown Unknown Incr Incr Unkown Incr Sta Incr 
46 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
47 Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr 




49 Incr Incr Incr Incr Sta Sta Decr Incr Incr Incr 
50 Incr Incr Incr Sta Sta Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
51 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
52 Incr Incr Incr Sta Sta Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
53 Incr Unkown Unknown Unknown Sta Incr Incr Incr Sta Incr 
55 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
56 Incr Sta Sta Sta Sta Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
58 Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
59 Incr Incr Unknown Unknown Incr Incr Decr Incr Incr Incr 
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Which issue do your prefer to 
answer in interview: 
1) Only costs 
2) Both of costs and Benefits
1 Decr Decr Decr 1 
2 Decr Decr Decr 1 
3 Decr Decr Decr 1 
4 Decr Decr Decr 1 
5 Decr Sta Decr 1 
6 Decr Decr Decr 1 
7 Incr Decr Decr 1 
8 Decr Decr Decr 1 
9 Sta Sta Sta 1 
10 Sta Sta Sta 1 
13 Sta Sta Sta 1 
15 Sta Sta Sta 1 
16 Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 
17 Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 
18 Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 
19 Decr Decr Decr 1 
20 Sta Sta Sta 1 
21 Decr Decr Decr 1 
22 Decr Decr Decr 1 
24 Decr Sta Decr 1 
25 Decr Sta Sta 1 
26 Decr Decr Sta 1 
27 Decr Sta Sta 1 
28 Decr Decr Decr 1 
29 Decr Decr Decr 1 
30 Decr Decr Decr 1 
31 Decr Decr Decr 1 
32 Decr Decr Decr 1 
33 Decr Decr Decr 1 
34 Decr Sta Sta 1 
35 Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 
36 Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 
37 Decr Decr Decr 1 
38 Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 
39 Decr Decr Decr 1 
40 Sta Sta Sta 1 
41 Sta Sta Sta 1 
42 Decr Sta Decr 1 
43 Decr Decr Decr 1 
44 Decr Decr Decr 1 
45 Sta Sta Sta 1 
46 Decr Decr Decr 1 




48 Decr Sta Sta 1 
49 Decr Sta Sta 1 
50 Sta Sta Sta 1 
51 Decr Decr Decr 1 
52 Decr Decr Decr 1 
53 Decr Sta Sta 1 
55 Decr Sta Sta 1 
56 Decr Sta Sta 1 
58 Decr Decr Decr 1 
59 Decr Sta Sta 1 




Appendix 5: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Date:   
Part 1: General information 
1. Interviewee name : ............................................................... Age: .................. 
Male    Female   
2. Address:  
Hamlet ………….Commune………………District ……………Province………… 
3. How many years have you been living here? …………………….years. 
4. Main income of your family from: 
Fishing                          Fisheries processing      Fish trade and service        
Fisheries aquaculture   Breeding/Cultivating       Others............................  
5. Please estimate the percentages of family income from all of fisheries - related Jobs (fishing, 
aquaculture, service, etc.) 
Less than 25%                 From 25 to 49%                50%               
From 51% to 74%       From 75 to 99%          100%  
 
Part 2: The co-management information 
 
6.  Have there been any management activities in Trao Reef before IMA (now is MCD), 2001? 
Yes               No   
7. If “Yes” , which is activity below: 
 Training in order to increasing awareness of fishermen 
 Monitoring, controlling, and surveillance in fishing in Trao reef area. 
 Livelihood 
 Total above activities 
8. The co-management area was built by:  
 The needs of local community 
 Government 
 Private organization 
 I do not know 
 
9. In personal idea, do you know the necessary of establishing co-management in Trao Reef? 
 Yes             No  
 
10. Were there any groups/associations which operated in this area? 
Yes             No  
11. Did you participate in that groups/associations? 
Yes             No  
Please tell the name of this group/association ………………………………………… 
12. Did these groups/associations operate successful? 
Efficiency             Inefficiency  
If inefficiency, why? …………………………………………………………………… 
 
Part 3: Participation in Co-management 
 
13. Now, who make management decision in Trao Reef? 
Government                       Resident                       Both  
14. Before establishing Co-management area, who made decision in managing and regulations in Trao 
Reef? 




15. Have you participated any activities in Co-management area from beginning to now? 
Yes             No  
If “Yes”, Which are activities? 
 Survey and choose the area 
 Training 
 Propaganda 
 Make related documents 
 reservation activities 
 Controlling and protection 
 Monitoring 
 Livelihood 






16. Did you have any suggestion/propose to local government and other stakeholders to solve the 
difficulties in implementing the activities in Trao Reef? 
Yes             No  
Did you pleasure with this solution? Yes             No  
If “No” , why? ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Part 4 : Co-management efficiency  
17. In your opinions, how the establishing co-management area affects in below fields?  
  Worse Unchanged Better 
1 Environment in co-management area    
2 General fisheries resources    
3 High value species    
4 Local species of fish    
5 Size of fish    
6 Scope and status of ecosystem    
7 Volume of violation cases (exterminated fishing, 
capture in restricted areas, … ) in CM area.  
   
8 Living standard of Residents in Local    
9 Job opportunities    
10 Awareness of residents in general about 
environment, … 
   
11 The behavior in associating among stakeholders.    
12 Residents’ knowledge of policy and laws    
 
18. Now, which funds do the co-management system rely on? 
Community         Government        Other stakeholder    
Do you willing to contribute for maintaining the implementation of the model if it’s funds rely on other 
stakeholder or Government,  
Yes             No  
Which ways do you choose to contribute by: 
Labor             Money               Assets  
19. Your proposals to improve the efficiency of co-management area:  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you for your answers! 
